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Abstract 
Administrative rules have played a central role in Ethiopian public administration since 
1994 when the current constitution was adopted. However, if the formulation and 
implementation of the rules are not politically controlled, and proper accountability is not 
applied, these same rules could become threats instead of assurances of the rule of law 
and order. This case study explored what strategic controls and accountability measures 
are in place to regulate the rulemaking process. To inform the study, the political control 
of bureaucracy framework in general and the principal–agency model, in particular, were 
used. The central research question focused on strategies that ensure the political control 
and accountability of rulemaking in Ethiopia. Purposive sampling methods were 
employed, with interviews  of five legislators and five appointed offcials, as well as 
supportive legislative documents providing the data.  The data were coded and 
thematically analyzed using a coding framework and a continuous iterative process.  The 
results revealed that in Ethiopia there is a constitutional framework of control and 
accountability, but there is no political control mechanism in place, and no accountability 
measures have been taken. The study findings may indicate that there is a need for further 
studies on administrative and judicial review mechanisms and federated states‘ control 
mechanisms to fully understand the situation. The implication for social change includes 
awareness and attitudinal change of lawmakers and administrative authorities towards the 
importance of controlling and limiting the power to make rules. Positive social change is 
nearly impossible where unlimited and uncontrolled power is exercised.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
One of the conditions for sustaining a democratic system is controlling the 
coercive power of the government through the rule of law and principles of 
accountability (Fukuyama, 2013). Separating the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
powers of the state into three bodies is one way of controlling the power (Fukuyama, 
2013; Pecaric, 2015). The concept of separation of powers, where the three functions of 
government are vested in different branches is one of the peculiarities of democratic 
political governance (Fukuyama, 2014; Pecaric, 2015). 
Regardless of the character and structure of the government, if a state is 
democratic, the lawmaking power is vested in the legislature. The authority to execute 
those laws rests on the executive branch, and the ability to adjudicate the laws lies with 
the judiciary branch. In a democracy, neither the executive nor the judiciary branch could 
make laws by themselves, unless the body of the lawmakers confers some of its 
lawmaking powers on them (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
However, studies show that legislators could not make all forms of policies and 
laws because of the lack of broad technical capability on each public policy matter, lack 
of expertise, and lack of organizational flexibility (Fukuyama, 2014; Pecaric, 2015). 
Thus, the body of lawmakers transfers authority of rulemaking to bureaucratic agencies 
through legislation. In addition to authorization of public agencies to make detailed rules, 
the legislators depend on the agencies for information to make the broad policies, while 
the power of bureaucratic agencies depends on the legitimacy of the policymakers. Such 
2 
  
interdependency between the principals and the agents makes the policy-making process 
sophisticated (Carpenter & Moss, 2014; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD], 2017; Workman, 2015).  
Nevertheless, a delegation of legislative powers is not without cost because, in 
addition to their influences on the policy-making process, bureaucratic agencies could 
make rules that promote their policy preference and self-interest (Degol & Kedir, 2013; 
Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). They might also use the opportunity to expand their powers. 
The authorized bodies might advance their self-interest and expand their powers through 
different mechanisms including the delay of the rulemaking action, total inaction or 
ignoring the authority to make rules. When there are deviance and expansion of power 
through the formulation of regulation, it could violate human rights, the rule of law, and 
the principles of accountability of the government, and noncompliance ( Kerwin & 
Furlong, 2011). 
The debate on the necessity of delegation of agencies is not within the scope of 
this research. Instead, in this the study I was concerned with the ability of the legislative 
body to prevent an abuse of power and noncompliance. Though legislators could transfer 
the power to executive and judiciary branches, the purpose of this study is also limited to 
the delegation of legislative power to the executive branch because it is a more common 
practice in Ethiopia (Degol & Kedir, 2013; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
I conducted the case study that considered the Ethiopian delegating of legislative 
power and the ability of legislators to control the process of applying this delegated 
legislative power. The situation in Ethiopia seems favorable for the study because in 
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Ethiopia the institution of democracy is only about 20 years old. After hundreds of years 
of monarchical rule and 17 years of military regime, Ethiopia adopted a constitution that 
recognized international human rights‘ norms, conventions, and a multiparty system in 
1995 (Bach, 2011; Degol & Kedir, 2013). I believe that the case of Ethiopia might be an 
ideal situation to demonstrate the scenario where lawmakers do not set a controlling 
mechanism when delegating some of their powers to the executive bodies, particularly in 
the developing world.   
Thus, the purpose of this case study was to explore strategies that Ethiopian 
lawmakers use to prevent abuse of power and noncompliance in administrative 
rulemaking. I believe the findings of this study could potentially contribute to a positive 
social change by enlightening the legislative authorities on their oversight role to prevent 
abuse of power and noncompliance. Even though I conducted the study at the federal 
level and only in political control, the implications translate to the judiciary review, 
administrative review and control mechanisms in the nine federated regional states.  
In this chapter, I introduce the problem by explaining literature related to the 
topic. I also explain the gap in the literature that I expected to be narrowed by the 
findings of the study. The chapter contains an explanation of the purpose of conducting 
the study and a summary of the background of the research by reviewing some of the 
relevant literature. The significance of the research and its implications for positive social 
change are some of the significant issues that this chapter addresses. I introduce the 
theoretical framework that I used to inform the study, and the chapter ends with a 
presentation of the nature of the study and its delineations and limitations. 
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Background 
For a democratic system to survive as a system, state power must be limited by 
the values of the rule of law that asserts government accountability. One of the 
mechanisms of making the government accountable is separating the function of the state 
into the legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies of the government (Manning, 2015; 
Pecaric, 2015; Sohoni, 2016). The topic of this research is related to the nature of 
democratic governance, which is a system of reconciling coercive state powers, the rule 
of law, and democratic accountability of the government (Fukuyama, 2013). However, it 
is becoming apparent that strict separation of powers is not applicable to current public 
administration in the democratic administrations(Manning, 2015; Pecaric, 2015). 
On the one hand, the lawmakers depend on the bureaucratic agencies for broad 
technical knowledge and information that enables them to make informed policy 
decisions. On the other hand, the bureaucratic agencies depend on the policymakers for 
the legitimacy of their authority to make rules. Thus, the concept of delegation of 
legislative powers whereby the lawmaking body delegates some of its powers to the 
administrative bodies is inevitable.  
The literature reveals that there is still a contest regarding whether delegating 
legislative rulemaking power to administrative bodies is a proper decision in light of the 
guiding principles of separation of powers (Kelley, 2017; Iuliano, 2018; Hesick & 
Hessick, 2013). In this regard, the Ethiopian constitution granted all lawmaking powers 
to the parliament along with discretionary authority to authorize administrative bodies to 
pass regulations (Degol & Kedir, 2013; House of Peoples Representatives, 1995). Article 
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77 (13) of the Ethiopian constitution granted the parliament full discretionary power to 
authorize the council of ministers to enact regulations. Accordingly, the authority of the 
cabinet to make regulations lies at the discretion of the body of lawmakers. Hence, the 
focus of this study is not on the contention of delegation and nondelegation. Instead, the 
focus of this study will be directed towards the possible consequences of uncontrolled 
legislative power reconcentrating in the hands of the administrative bodies and what 
possible rectifying mechanisms could be put in place. 
Gaps in Prior Research 
Administrative bodies could make nonstatutory rules in different ways. They can 
make such nonstatutory rules because of their insensitivity to the rule of law, separation 
of powers, and private rights (Daniels, 2014; Walker, 2015). They could also make non-
statutory rules by interpreting ambiguous legislation in a way that could promote self-
interest and policy preference (Walker, 2015). Furthermore, they might intentionally 
cross the lines by violating delegation guidelines, principles, and limitations (Daniels, 
2014; Walker, 2015; West & Raso, 2012). One of the solutions in such cases is legislative 
oversight. 
The possibilities of making nonstatutory rules in the rulemaking and possible 
solutions to address those problems are dealt with in the literature about western 
democracy. However, there is a gap in the literature on applicability in countries such as 
Ethiopia where democracy is young and formulated in a domestic context. 
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The Ethiopian Situation 
Though Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries in the world, it had been under a 
monarchical regime where there was no rule of law with accountability of the 
government or any form of democracy (Bach, 2011; Regassa, 2010). After a long history 
of the monarchical rule, a military regime under the banner of socialist ideology held 
power by a coup from 1974-1991. Under the army rule, there was no election, no 
freedom of expression, and no multiparty system (Regassa, 2010). After about 4 years of 
transition from 1991-1995, in 1995 a democratic constitution that ratified international 
democratic and human rights norms and conventions was adopted as the supreme law of 
the land (House of Peoples Representatives, 1995; Regassa, 2010).  
The 1995 Constitution introduced the rule of law, accountability of the 
government, a multiparty system, and the freedom of citizens with responsibility. It was 
the first constitution in the history of the country to declare the public as the source of all 
political powers, and free election as the only appropriate way to hold power (Alemu, 
2015; Degol &Kedir, 2013). 
As the concept of the rule of law with accountability of the government is new to 
the country, oversight of the use of the power of government about its delivery of public 
services such as rendering justice is vital for sustainability and enhancement of 
democratic administration. 
Article 55 (17) of the constitution granted to the legislative body, in general 
terms, the power to control and have oversight of all activities of the executive branch 
and the bureaucratic agencies. Accordingly, the legislative branch has the authority to 
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question the prime minister and other federal officials and to investigate their conduct 
regarding discharging of their duties and responsibilities. In addition to their original 
executive powers, Article 77(13) of the constitution granted power to the executive body 
to exercise rulemaking powers such as passing regulations. As discussed earlier, the 
legislative body granted such power in the form of delegation. Beyond the general terms, 
the constitution did not set any test of compliance checklist, review mechanisms, or 
controlling mechanisms of legislative power. However, Article 59(2) of the constitution 
granted the House an authority to adopt rules and procedures regarding the legislative 
process.  
Accordingly, the House enacted in 2006 as amended in 2016 a regulation under 
the title of The House of peoples‘ representatives working procedure and the members' 
code of conduct. Among other things, the regulation set a mechanism of delegating 
legislative power to different public bodies. Article 61 of the regulation stipulated 
mechanisms of delegation, provisions, and punishments for noncompliance. Article 61(2) 
prohibited rulemaking without explicit delegation. Article 61(3), ordered the House to 
mention the delegated public organ. Article 61(4) and (5) said all regulations and 
directives must be within the scope of the delegation and in alignment with the purpose 
of the parent legislation. Article 61(6) of ordered any delegated authority to make the rule 
within 3 months. According to Article 61(7) of the regulation, any regulation shall be 
accessible to all persons. Finally, article 61(8), which is the last subarticle, stipulated that 
any federal authority that did not make such rules accessible shall be accountable. 
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Though the study covered the Ethiopian delegation doctrines, a political control 
mechanism in the lens of the principal–agency model, the criteria in the literature, and the 
House regulation, I picked specific legislation enacted under the title of registration of 
vital events and national identity card proclamation number 760/2012 as a case. The 
proclamation was enacted in 2012. The legislation has two parts. The first part is about 
registration of vital events such as birth, marriage, and death, while the second part is 
about the national identity card. The first part amended 70 year old legislation (Article 
68). However, the second part, which covered chapter 3 of the legislation, introduced a 
new policy to the country (Article 55-62). This policy was unique because there was no 
such thing as a national identity card uniformly applicable throughout the country. The 
purpose of introducing a national identity card policy is stipulated in the preamble of the 
legislation (House of the Peoples Representatives, 2012a). 
Accordingly, the purpose of the national policy of issuing an identity card is to 
protect national security and to provide efficient services to citizens, which implies the 
essentiality of this policy. The legislation said that the proclamation should be operational 
within 2 years, which meant until 2014 (Articles 67 and 70). The legislation (Article 55) 
granted a power to make rules to the cabinet to enact a regulation thereby to establish an 
appropriate federal organ to carry out the national identity card policy without which the 
relevant section of the legislation could not be operational. However, Article 55 and 
Article 69(1) of the legislation grants an unassertive delegation stating that the council of 
ministries may issue a regulation. The word "may/might" in legal terms gives a 
discretionary power.  The same legislation Article 69(2) grants authority to a nonexisting 
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appropriate federal organ to issue directives regarding the registration requirements and 
service fees. I learned that the legislation is not yet operational and that the proper organ 
has not yet been established.  
Though my interest was in the doctrine of delegating legislative power and 
controlling the use of the power and possible noncompliance, I picked the legislation that 
introduced a national identity card because there were many questions to address 
including the delegation of legislative power to a nonexistent organ. This study added to 
the topic's worth in filling the literature gap in the Ethiopian perspective. 
Problem Statement 
Policy makers need authority and information to pass a legitimate and meaningful 
public policy. In a democracy, the legitimacy of the policymakers must come from the 
constitution. However, in most cases, necessary information to approve the policy comes 
from the relevant bureaucratic agencies (Carpenter & Moss, 2014; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2017; Workman, 2015). Because of 
their sophisticated technical capability and information advantage, bureaucratic agencies 
could influence the public policy process in prioritizing the policy agenda and in the 
process of developing the policy document (Yackee, 2013). In addition to their 
sophisticated influences on the policy-making process, the bureaucratic agencies get 
authorization from the policymakers to make rules for prescription of the same broad 
policies (Daniels, 2014; Iuliano, 2018; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). Together, the 
information advantage in the policy area and the authorization to further prescribe the 
policy give much autonomy to the agencies to grab more power and to promote their 
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interests against the intended policy objectives (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; 
Yackee, 2013).  
Thus, the lawmakers should set political controlling mechanisms so that they 
could prevent bureaucratic agencies from influencing and directing the public policy 
goals toward their policy preferences (Daniels, 2014; Walker, 2015). Such bureaucratic 
agents‘ behavior has been studied in the western governance systems; there is a gap in the 
literature concerning their implications for the Ethiopian situation.   
In an attempt to fill this gap in the Ethiopian literature, I focused this study on the 
possibilities of redirecting public policy goals towards bureaucratic agencies and interest 
group policy preferences. I conducted the study in a context of Proclamation 760/2012, 
the registration of vital events and national identity card proclamation. I picked the piece 
of legislation as a case to review doctrine and mechanism of legislative oversight to 
prevent the abuse of power and redirection of public policy goals to bureaucratic or 
industrial policy preferences in the rulemaking process.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and increase the 
understanding of how the Ethiopian lawmakers could effectively prevent and 
noncompliance of the administrative agencies regarding the rulemaking. Since regulatory 
agencies could abuse the rulemaking power by redirecting public policy goals into their 
personal, organizational, or  industrial policy preferences, political control is vital. 
Additionally, the sources of most public policies in Ethiopia are the public agencies 
(Degol & Kedir, 2013). 
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Administrative agencies should not only take part in the rulemaking but also in 
the process of making broad policy that will later be a source of an authorization to 
prescribe the rules. Thus, this study tried to understand the possibilities of power abuse 
and possible preventive mechanisms that could be applied in the context of Ethiopia. The 
approach follows a qualitative paradigm and analyzes legal documents and interview data 
to fill the literature gap and fulfill the purpose of the study. 
Research Questions 
The central question for this qualitative study was:  
RQ: What strategies would ensure an effective political control for preventing a 
possible abuse of power and noncompliance in the process of rulemaking in 
Ethiopia? 
The subquestions that helped further guide the inquiry were: 
SQ1: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on delegating 
rulemaking power? 
SQ2: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on the issue of 
political control and accountability?   
SQ3: What are the ex-ante/ex-post political control mechanisms in the rulemaking 
process?  
Theoretical Foundation 
In qualitative research, theories play a crucial role in informing the issue under 
study (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015). Accordingly, I used the principal–agency model 
(Mitnick, 1975a, 1975b). The model has been used to understand the rulemaking process 
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(Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011; Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, & Licari, 2015). The principal 
agency model is one of the groups of theories in theoretical frameworks of controls of 
bureaucracy (Frederickson et al., 2015). Therefore, I used the general framework of 
control bureaucracy and the principal–agency mode to inform the study. 
The principal-agent theory or model stemmed from economic studies of 
bureaucracy. Different scholars considered the bureaucratic agents as self-promoting and 
abusive of their superiority in accessing information to redirect public policy goals 
towards personal ends or institutional interest (Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & 
Furlong, 2011). The model is attributed to Mitnick (1975a, 1975b). A principal-agent 
problem occurs when delegated agents promote their interest rather that of the delegators 
in the rulemaking process (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015).  
In this study, the Ethiopian body of lawmakers who had inherent power was 
considered a principal while the administrative bodies were regarded as their agents. The 
principal-agent relationship exists when the body of lawmakers authorizes administrative 
bodies to make rules (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015). Agents 
could have their personal goals, professional interests, risk appetite, risk aversion 
strategy, and policy preferences that are not in line with the policy objectives set by the 
principals.  
Agents might not have only distinct interests but also advantages over their 
principals. Some of the advantages include information asymmetry in area expertise, 
technical capacity, and organizational readiness. Also, administrative bodies might not 
have public pressures as the elected official do face (Walker, 2015).  
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Thus, because of the motive and the opportunity to do so, the agents could make 
rules that promote their interests and favor unendorsed policy preferences (Kerwin & 
Furlong, 2011). In addition to the earlier mentioned reasons, agents could be insensitive 
to individual rights when compared to their sensitivity to collective public interests 
(Sohoni, 2016). Thus, the control of the bureaucracy theoretical framework in general 
and the principal-agent model, in particular, seem to be the relevant theoretical 
formworks for this study.   
Nature of the Study 
The nature of the inquiry was qualitative, using the case study method. A 
qualitative approach appeared to be the relevant approach to explore the perceptions of 
participants about the ability of and mechanism for a legislative body to delegate 
rulemaking power and still control that power from being redirected towards unendorsed 
goals. I intended the research question to help me explore what strategies the lawmakers 
use to control the bureaucratic agencies without adversely affecting their effectiveness 
and efficiency. Thus, the fact that the study was focused on a single process and 
legislation makes a case study approach more relevant (Rudestam & Newton, 2015; Yin, 
2014).   
Definitions 
The central concepts in this research process were legislative delegation, political 
control, and rulemaking. However, to explain this process, various essential concepts and 
terms are used in this dissertation. Therefore, I provide the following working definitions 
of the relevant underlying terms.  
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Administrative rules/rules and regulations (in the Ethiopian context): Regulations 
enacted by the council of ministers and directives that are formulated by each 
ministry/agency. 
Agency/public agency/administrative body/ executive organ/bureaucratic 
authority: The terms that might include all Ethiopian federal executive bodies under 
different names such as ministries, attorney general, services, commissions, authorities, 
offices, administrations, centers, institutes, and agencies. 
Delegation doctrine: A principle or set of guidance  that lawmakers adopted to 
manage the implementation of a delegation of legislative powers (Manning, 2015). 
Democracy: A system of political governance whereby all concerned parties can 
participate in a decision-making process that matters, directly or through representatives, 
equally and without any repression (Christiano, 2015). 
Judicial review: The power of courts to do an ex-post review over the legislative 
decisions of the body of lawmakers and of the executive when there is contention 
(Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011).   
Legislative delegation: Delegation of legislative powers, a process of transferring 
rulemaking power to the executive body or its branches by the body of lawmakers 
(Daniels, 2014; Kerwin& Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015). 
Legislative oversight: A set of policies, mechanisms, and activities that elected 
officials use to control the proper exercise of the delegated legislative power (Daniels, 
2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015).  
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Principal-agent problem: The existence of a conflict of interest between 
delegators and the delegated. Such conflict happens when the delegate uses the delegated 
power for promoting personal and organizational interests contrary to the principal‘s 
interest (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
Regulatory capture: The control of policy decision-making or redirecting public 
policy contrary to the public interest by the bureaucracy, industry or other interest groups 
(Yackee, 2013, OECD, 2017).   
Rulemaking: A process of promulgating regulations and directives by the 
executive body (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
Assumptions, Scope, Delimitation, and Limitations 
Assumptions are realities that a researcher takes for granted at least until the 
completion of the research because without which the research would be irrelevant. They 
are somewhat out of the researcher's control, but if they were to disappear, the study 
would become irrelevant (Simon, 2011). Thus, in this research, I assumed that the 
Ethiopian constitution gives equal value to state power and citizens‘ freedom. In the 
absence of this assumption, the findings of this study become unrealistic. The other 
assumption is that the existing legislative process would continue without change at least 
until the end of the study. If the process changes, then the entire framework of the study 
changes.  
Another critical assumption is that participants' were honest in sharing their 
knowledge of the process. A lack of honesty would adversely affect the study. Therefore, 
by repeatedly explaining the purpose of the inquiry and the importance of their 
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participation, I ensured that the participants were taking the issue seriously and could be 
forthright with no repercussion.  
Limitations of the research referred to weaknesses that are out of the researcher's 
control but for which the researcher can set mitigating mechanisms (Simon, 2011). I used 
a structured approach to the study design (see Maxwell, 2013). One of the limitations of 
the structured approach is a restriction of flexibility and opportunity to see new 
developments. To correct the weakness, I was consciously open to adapting to emerging 
ideas. The second limitation might be related to sampling. It is difficult to be sure about 
the representativeness of the sample in the interview. My limited experience in coding 
and setting themes might also have been a limitation because the inexperience might 
expose me to biases in pattern recognition, coding, and theme. Thus, I considered and 
exploited most of the available tools to make sure that the limitations and weaknesses 
were not undermining the validly of the study.   
The scope or delimitation of the inquiry is one of the considerations in designing a 
study. Scope or delimitation means the nature of the investigation that determines its 
boundaries (Simon, 2011). There would be many ways to explore the issue, which could 
include evaluating the effect of the delegation by researching the already promulgated 
rules and their implementations. Furthermore, the behavior of lawmakers in this regard 
could be studied by assessing all forms of legal and policy decisions. In this case, 
however, the decision process about legislative delegation limited the scope. Another 
relevant yet not considered issue is the process of delegation of legislative powers in the 
nine federated states. The effects on the lives of citizens‘ state laws could be as vital as 
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federal statutes, but they were beyond the scope of this study. However, a careful and 
diligent examination of the federal delegation of legislative powers would have 
significant relevance to understanding the relevant federal and state level policy 
decisions.  
The Significance of the Study 
This study identified the possibility of benefiting from authorizing administrative 
bodies to exercise the full power to make rules and controlling the extent and methods of 
application of the power. It addressed how far public agencies could go to use their 
delegated power to make rules that deviated from goals set by the lawmakers. 
Furthermore, by doing such exploration in the study, I tried to fill a gap in the literature.  
Although there are studies related to political control and agency autonomy in the 
context of the process of authorization of public bodies to make rules and to control the 
authority in the western democracy, there is no study that considers the Ethiopian 
situation. Thus, the contribution of the study could be significant and original. The 
importance of the study includes contributing to the enhancement of regulatory 
effectiveness, the rule of law, and accountability of administrators. 
Implications for Social Change 
I believe that the results of this study could strengthen positive social change and 
enlightening the importance of controlled power in rulemaking, which means addressing 
issues of the rule of law and accountability and compliance in the process of the 
application of the delegated legislative power. Though the study was conducted at the 
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federal level, its implications could also apply to the state level authorization of state-
level administrative bodies to make rules.   
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I introduced the nature and importance of the study. The purpose 
of the study was to explore the mechanisms of contorting the possibilities of redirecting 
public policy goals towards personal, institutional, or industrial policy preferences while 
allowing the bureaucracy to exercise its power. There might be many ways of controlling 
the government after delegating the power. Some of them are a legislative oversight, 
incentivizing, judicial review, and de-authorization.  
However, I believed that there was a gap in the literature about possibilities of 
power abuse in the rulemaking process and possible preventive mechanisms in the 
Ethiopian context. The central research question was about strategies ensuring effective 
political control mechanism for preventing abuse of power and non- compliance in the 
process of rulemaking in Ethiopia. 
The study used a qualitative approach to address the RQ and SQs. The result of 
the study could be significant in creating awareness for the lawmakers. If the lawmakers 
try to use the results and recommendations, it will have a positive impact on social 
change, because creating a controlled rulemaking power is the source of positive social 
change. Nevertheless, the scope of the study is limited to the federal level authorization 
of administrative bodies to make rules.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Democracy is the only viable governance system so far that is capable of 
reconciling power and accountability (Fukuyama, 2014; 2015). The building blocks of 
the democratic governance are the coercive power monopolized by the state, the 
institution of the rule of law, and accountability of government (Fukuyama, 2014). The 
government holds a monopolistic, coercive power over citizens. On the other hand, the 
institutions of the rule of law and accountability limit the power of the government for 
the sake of the citizens‘freedom.   
Rulemaking is one of the critical decision-making processes where government 
displays its power (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). Though free exercise of the rulemaking 
power is fundamental for effectiveness, an efficiency of public service delivery; 
controlling  of the same power is also imperative for the sake of the rule of law and the 
principle of accountability. In this study, I explored the delegated power and the need to 
control power through the lens of the principal-agent model (Frederickson et al. 2015; 
Kerwin & Furlong, 2011).  
Political control is one of the features of democratic rulemaking in the democratic 
governance system. On the one hand, rules give power to the administrators; on the other 
hand, they limit the ability of the administrators, which in turn restricts the power of the 
government. Rules then become ways of promoting freedom and liberty for all. Similarly, 
rules could enhance or restrict the substantive and procedural rights of the citizens 
(Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
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The transfer of lawmaking power could enable administrators to get more 
coercive power for themselves and put at risk the rule of law and decrease administrative 
accountability (Walker, 2015). Administrators might want more power at the risk of 
freedom to make quick decisions (Walker, 2015; Daniels, 2014). Concerning the issue of 
authorization of public bodies and controlling their power, there is enough literature in 
the context of western democratic culture, while the literature is not sufficient to review 
the same subject in the Ethiopian context. The purpose of the study was to explore how 
the principal-agent issue could be manifested in the rulemaking and what controlling 
mechanisms could rectify it within the Ethiopian situation.   
This chapter highlights the research strategy and reviews the theoretical concept 
of the principal-agent model, including the historical development of the concept. The 
discussion includes the nature of the model and its application in different sectors and 
field of studies. After introducing the research strategy, I address in this chapter the 
concept of the control of bureaucracy and the principal-agent model in light of its 
relevance to this study. 
Beyond considering the general concept of the theory, I discuss in this chapter the 
concept of the democratic system and its fundamental principles with application to 
policy-making, particularly in the delegation of legislative powers and its application 
when delegated. Because the study is conducted in the Ethiopian context, I review and 
introduce the Ethiopian political system and policy-making process along with the nature 
and form of Ethiopian democratic governance. The chapter ends by introducing the 
methodology and design of the research.    
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Literature Search Strategy 
In most cases, I use Walden library‘s databases such as SAGE Primer, Ebsco, 
LegalTrack, and Google Scholar. However, the easiest way to get access to relevant 
resources through Walden was Google Scholar. This was helpful, mainly when I did not 
know the exact article. I wrote the search term on Google Scholar‘s window, and if it was 
available in Walden library, then I could access it. The other strategy I used was to refer 
to the reference list of a relevant article and copy and paste the titles of the articles in that 
reference into Walden library‘s finding specific article window for easy access.  
During this process, I learned a unique strategy that helped me search the most 
recent articles. This was through accessing an item in Google Scholar or the Google 
search engine; I took note of how many times the article has been cited, which was 
valuable information in my decision on which material to refer to. The number of 
citations revealed the importance of the article and the number of consequently related 
articles that were published. Some of the terms I used in searching the materials included 
political control, legislative oversight, legislative review, oversight mechanism, policy 
capture, regulatory capture, democracy, rulemaking, agency theory, principal-agent 
problems, and values. Additionally, I used search terms such as Ethiopian politics, 
Ethiopian history, rulemaking in Ethiopia, policy-making in Ethiopia, and legislative 
delegation. 
Theoretical Framework 
The central question in this study focused on what strategies would ensure 
effective political control of bureaucratic agencies in exercising their delegating power to 
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make rules in the Ethiopian federal government. The purpose was to elicit the importance 
of political control to prevent any power abuse and policy redirection in the process of 
administrative rulemaking.  
Thus, the theoretical framework that was best suited to serve as a lens for this 
study was the principal–agency model, which was developed in fields of economics and 
institutional studies of bureaucracy (Mitnick, 1975a, 1975b). Different scholars 
considered the bureaucratic agencies self-promoting and suggested that they abuse their 
information superiority as a tool to redirect public policy goals and repurpose the 
legislative power (Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011). 
The model was applied in the administrative rulemaking process (Frederickson et 
al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011). One of the situations for the principal-agent 
relationship to exist would be the delegating of legislative power to administrative bodies 
to make rules (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015). Agents could try 
to achieve their personal goals, professional interests, risk appetite, risk aversion strategy, 
and policy preferences that were not in line with the publicly endorsed ones. They could 
try to achieve institutional and industrial interest rather than the public interest. 
In addition to the policy preferences of their own and the industries they prefer or 
regulate, bureaucratic agents have an advantage over their principals. Some of the 
advantages included superior access to information, area expertise, technical capacity, 
and structural readiness (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015). With 
the motivation and the opportunity to decide, the agents could make rules that promote 
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their interests and unendorsed policy preferences (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Sohoni, 
2016). 
In this study, the Ethiopian body of lawmakers that has an inherent power is 
considered a principal while executive bodies at different levels are considered agents. 
Thus, the control of the bureaucracy theoretical framework in general and the principal-
agent model, in particular, was the relevant theoretical formwork for this study.   
Origin of Principal-Agent Model 
The principal–agency model is one of the models under the theoretical framework 
of control of bureaucracy (Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011). There are 
underlying assumptions behind the theoretical framework and the model. If a researcher 
rejects the assumptions, the researcher rejects the validity of the theoretical framework 
and the model (Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011). 
In a democratic governance system, there is leadership policy-making aspect and 
administrative-implementation aspect of policies. The policymakers represent the public 
interest. They make policies and oversee the implications of the policies they made. On 
the other hand, the administrative agencies implement the policies (Cohen, 1971; 
Workman, 2015). Though each body influences the other, the relationship between the 
policy-maker principals and bureaucratic agents are somehow dichotomous. 
The principal–agency model is based on the assumption that there is a dichotomy 
between policies and administrations, which implies policy makers and bureaucratic 
authorities might have dichotomous interests (Frederickson et al., 2015;  Kerwin, & 
Furlong, 2011; Mitnick, 1975a; Yaver, 2015). The second assumption is that the 
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relationship between policymakers (principals) and bureaucratic authorities (agents) is 
hierarchical. In this case, administrative agents can be difficult to control. However, it is 
controllable (Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011; Mitnick, 1975a). The 
assumptions implied that there is always a conflict of interest between the principals, who 
represent the public interest, and the bureaucratic agents who mostly represent their 
personal, institutional, and industrial interests (Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011). 
However, some scholars reject the existence of a dichotomy between policy-
making and their implementation or between the policy-making bodies and the 
administrative bodies. The theoretical frameworks used to explain the nonexistence of 
dichotomy between the two are known as theories of bureaucratic politics or bureau 
dominance theories (Curry, 2015; Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011).  
Some scholars try to rectify the polarized assumption by treating the relationship 
between the policymakers and authorized bureaucrats as dynamic and interdependent 
(Workman, 2015). The assumption behind this approach is that the principals have formal 
authorities to make rules, while the agents, which are informal authorities, have the 
advantages of broad technical capabilities and information over the policymakers. Thus, 
the lack of legitimate authority makes the agents dependent on the elected officials while 
the elected officials are dependent on the bureaucrat agents for technical capability and 
information (Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011; Workman, 2015).  
The Sources of Agency Problem 
The personal and institutional interest of public administrators to expand their 
power and to get more is an additional crucial factor (Walker; 2015). The question 
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becomes why public administrators develop personal and institutional interests to 
broaden the power and to abuse the power they have. Administrative bodies could face 
internal and external pressures to pursue their personal and institutional preferences 
rather than public goals. The public administrators might develop financial or power 
interest beyond that for which they are authorized. Additionally, public administrators 
might want to promote their political or policy preference ( Brehm & Gates, 2014; 
Kelley, 2017; West & Raso, 2012).  
Public administrators are mostly appointed officials, not elected officials. Hence, 
they could not present their policy alternative to the public and get approval. However, 
they could develop an interest to implement their policy preferences. If agents develop 
such an interest that conflicts with the principals‘ interest, the conflict of interests could 
be the sources of a principal-agent problem (Bosse, & Phillips, 2016; Lewis & Selin, 
2015; Walker, 2015). Public administrators might not be as sensitive as elected officials 
when it comes to the public interest because they incline towards institutional or 
industrial interest than the public interest (Shapiro & Murphy, 2015). Therefore, an 
agency problem could emerge from the personal and institutional interest of bureaucratic 
authorities or lead to insensitivity towards the rule of law or the public interest. The two 
problems originate with the administrators.  
However, there might be external pressures from different groups such as political 
groups, lobbyists, and other stakeholders (Bosse, & Phillips, 2016; West & Raso, 2012). 
Most importantly, multiple and conflicting signals might come from different principals. 
For example, some agencies might be accountable to other cabinet-level agencies. This 
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kind of agent could be pressured by their ministers, the cabinet, and the lawmakers. Such 
conflicted interest signals might push agents to behave against the explicit or implied 
objectives of the lawmakers (Weaver, 2014; Worsham & Gatrell, 2005).  
Regulatory capture could be one of the sources of agency issue. The legislators 
(principals) are dependent on the bureaucratic agents for information and technical 
capabilities because the agents have sophisticated technical skills in their respective 
industries (Kerwin &Furlong, 2011; Workman, 2015). When the principals want to make 
a policy decision on some aspect of a given industry, whether the policy issues come 
from any interested group or the bureaucratic agency, they need to be informed by the 
agencies, who could be pressured by the industries they regulate (Carpenter & Moss, 
2014; Coglianese & Walkers, 2016; Kerwin &Furlong, 2011; Potter, Olejarski, & Pfister; 
2014; OECD, 2017). 
Given that the agencies have sophisticated knowledge of the area and the 
principals are dependent on the capability and information of the agencies that are 
inclined to favor the interest of industry, the regulatory process can be easily captured 
(OECD, 2017). Regulatory capture, according to Carpenter and Moss, (2014) is when a 
policy process or content of policy is repeatedly or consistently redirected away from the 
intended goal towards the industrial interests (Carpenter & Moss, 2014; OECD, 2017). 
Thus, in this case, regulatory capture is one of the sources of agency problems.  
Advantages and Strategies of Agents 
The previous section discusses the possible sources of agency problem, the 
motivation behind the infidelity of by the principals. However motive alone could not 
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make agents successful unless they have some particular advantages over the principals. 
Thus this section will review some of the advantages that agents could have over the 
principals.  
One of the paramount advantages is information asymmetry (Ruffing, 2015; 
Woods, 2018; Workman, 2015). Information asymmetry means upper hand information 
on the public policy issue. Administrators have information superiority over legislators 
and private citizens. The legislators enact laws over all aspects of public issues (Ruffing, 
2015). On the other hand, administrators work in one specific area (Johnson, 2013). For 
example, those who work on security-related matters have detail knowledge of the issue. 
Thus, they have the advantage of controlling the understanding of the public as well as 
that of the legislators. As a result, administrative agencies earn higher public trust than 
the lawmakers. 
The second significant advantage that administrators could have is related to the 
technicality of some public goals (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2015; Workman, 2015). Some 
general goals, such as environment, security, technology, health, and the like are 
technical. The administrators who have more resources on a specific industry or sector 
have more technical capability than the legislators. Such capability gives higher public 
acceptance and respect to agencies rather than the legislators. Because of their technical 
capability, administrators have a double advantage over the legislators. Their say in the 
matter make legislators give them credibility, which is the foundation for their policy 
matter; then they can influence the public and interest groups. With this influence, they 
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can choose to mislead legislators to enact a policy that gives them more room for their 
power expansion (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2015). 
Bureaucratic authorities have an interpretive advantage. As Walker ( 2015), 
observed it, agents could manipulate their statuary interpretation to promote institutional 
or personal goals by enacting non-statutory rules because bureaucratic agencies are the 
ones who have the power to interpret statute either to make a rule out of it or to 
implement it (Nourse,2014; Walker; 2015). Courts could intervene only when they are 
invited by disputing parties, who have legal standing or vested interest (Kerwin & 
Furlong, 2011). 
Administrative agencies could also use their autonomy as an advantage to 
noncompliance. The discussion implied that on the one hand, the delegation of legislative 
powers has been becoming imperative (Iuliano, 2018; Kelley, 2017; Manning, 2015). In 
countries such as Ethiopia, the authorization of administrative bodies to make rules is 
even constitutional, which means the body of lawmakers is endowed with the 
discretionary power to empower the executive to make rules (Degol &Kedir, 2013). If 
they are not autonomous administrators might become ineffective and indecisive. The 
interest of the public can be served only if the public administrators make a quick 
decision, formulate rules and regulations to be able to respond to demands in due time, 
effectively and efficiently (Daniels, 2014; Walker, 2015). For example, in national threat 
issues such as terrorism, administrators need to have a broad range of authority and 
flexibility (Lewis &Selin, 2015). However, public administrators might take their 
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freedom under the guise of national security and related threats as a tool to go astray 
against the objectives set by the principles(Etzioni, 2015).  
As a strategy, public agencies could use information hoarding as a tool to mislead 
the principals (Kerwin &Furlong, 2011; Walker; 2015). They might pressurize the 
principals by leaking some information to the public and hiring lobbyists to pressurize the 
principals might also be a tool ( Haeder&Yackee, 2015). In some case, agencies use a 
lack of resources or lack of capability as an excuse for noncompliance. At the same time, 
they might manipulate the dysfunctionalities of the principals, ideological polarizations 
and inter-party disagreement as a tool to buy time (Hill, 2015; Sant'Ambrogio, 2011; 
Nau, 2013). 
Applicability of the Principal-Agent Theory 
The principal-agent model first developed and applied to the financial and 
economic sector (Mitnick, 1975a, 1975b). The model addressed the relationships between 
shareholders and managers in banks and other financial firms. Then its application 
expanded to the public administration (Frederickson et al., 2015). In addition to its 
applicability to the general public administrations, specific areas such as an 
administrative rulemaking process to address relations between the lawmakers as 
principals and public agencies as agents (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015).  For 
more clarity, I reviewed the applicability of the model in the United States of America, in 
Africa and somehow in Ethiopia. 
In the United States of America, different researchers applied the theory in 
different fields of study among others things, the relationships between state legislators 
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and state bureaucrats, higher courts, lower courts, and different public agencies regarding 
their interpretation of legislative delegations.  
To provide working examples, I will mention Boushey and McGrath (2015). 
Boushey and McGrath examined the relationship between American state bureaucrats as 
agents and stated legislative organs- the governor and lawmakers as principals (Boushey 
& McGrath; 2015). In addition to its confirmation of that agents are not faithful to their 
principals; the study showed that public agencies exploit inter-branch conflicts or 
ideological polarizations between policymakers to pursue their policy preferences that 
contravene a political preference of principals. 
Sant'Ambrogio in 2011, tried to examine if the delay in rulemaking is somehow 
related to the principal–agency problem. In his study, Sant‘Ambrogio learned that agency 
delay in rulemaking is part of the agency issue. Understanding the fact that agency delay 
in rulemaking was part of the game when he suggested that a strong judiciary review 
doctrine is one of the solutions (Sant'Ambrogio in 2011).  
Kim (2011), tried to apply the principal–agency model to the hierarchical 
relations between higher courts and lower courts. In some cases, higher courts delegate 
some cases to lower courts. Thus, Kim tried to see if the lower courts as agents might 
pursue their interest regarding the delegated cases. However, he learned that though it 
was helpful to understand the situation, the model could not explain higher–lower court 
relationship very well because the relationship is not purely of a principal-agent as both 
courts equally serve the same policy objectives (Kim, 2011). 
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Walker ( 2015), used the principal- agency–model to see the relationship between 
the congress-as principal and the multiple agencies- as agents to examine how agents 
could manipulate statuary power make rules that promote institutional or personal goals 
by enacting non-statutory rules. In his examination of the issue by looking into the 
internal side of the multiple agencies including Holand Security Agency, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human Services he found out that agencies use 
statuary interpretation- as an opportunity to peruse their own goals. 
In 2006 IMF commissioned research on how the ministry of finance of 
developing (African countries) set ex-ante and ex-post controlling mechanisms to control 
the public expenditure before the apportioning of the budget. The researchers used 
principal–agency model to examine the issue, and they found that the ministry of finances 
could manage effectively to control if the public funds go to the objectives they are 
apportioned or not (Leruth, & Paul, 2006). 
Lane (2014), tried to examine the rule of law of Africa and Asia, mainly Burkina 
Faso, as an agency problem. He took the public as principal and bureaucratic authorities 
as agents. He concluded that the failure of or low score in the rule of law might come 
from not considering the bureaucratic authorities as agents or contractor parties who must 
discharge their contractual obligations (Lane, 2014). 
Amegnran (2017), in his dissertation study at Walden University, examined the 
role of Poll workers in Tongan 2015 presidential election using the principal agency 
model along with state capacity theory. He considered the election agency as a principal 
and the poll workers as agents because the election agency was entrusted by law for the 
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fair administration of the election (Amegnran, 2017). He found out that poll workers 
showed partisanship, and tribalism among other things, in discharging their duties, which 
means they perused their preferences in favoring a candidate from their tribe. 
Degol and Kadir (2013) conducted a review on the institutional and legal 
framework of administrative rulemaking in Ethiopia. Their purpose was to fill the 
literature gap in the area of administrative rulemaking and political control. They learned 
that there is a legal and institutional gap in controlling the administrative rulemaking 
process. The authors did not explicitly mention the principal–agency model, but 
implicitly treated the lawmakers as principals and the administrative agencies including 
the cabinet as agents (Degol and Kadir, 2013). 
Political Control Mechanisms and Accountability 
Setting a mechanism that holds rule makers accountable for the means and ends 
of what they do, regarding compliance is the only viable way of keeping the democratic 
system sustainable. In this section, I will review the essential tools so far formulated. I 
will discuss the mechanisms in two sections as ex-ante mechanisms and ex-post 
mechanisms. 
Ex-Ante Control Mechanisms 
The idea behind the ex-ante political control of administrative rulemaking 
decision-making is that lawmakers set legal, procedural and organizational mechanisms 
to regulate the behaviors of administrative agencies by limiting the choices and discretion 
of the agencies in their rulemaking process (Nicolai & Stea, 2014). The objective of the 
mechanisms is to make sure that public agencies are in line with the preferences of the 
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principals and complying with the objectives they set (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 
2011; Nicolai & Stea, 2014). The underlying mechanism of ex-ante control includes the 
following. 
One of the crucial elements of political control is limiting the delegation. 
Lawmakers must not delegate legislative power that gives broad discretional power to 
agencies (Furlong, 2011). The lawmakers might limit the discretionary power by using a 
precise phrase and by setting clear boundaries (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
The other controlling mechanisms could be regulating the rulemaking process and setting 
comments and notice procedures, mandatory interest group participation platforms. 
Structuring specific institutional mechanisms also enable the principals to control the 
rulemaking before the enactment of the rules (Balla, 2014; Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & 
Furlong, 2011; Nau, 2013). The lawmaker might control the process through relevant 
standing committees or appropriate office set for this purpose (Nicolai & Stea, 2014; 
Sant‘Ambrogio, 2011). Lawmakers could also set monetary intensives for compliance as 
a behavioral regulatory mechanism. Setting deadlines along with penalty clause and 
alternative rules – otherwise known as hammers could also help to control the process. 
Another important mechanism is legislative approval or veto. The lawmakers can set a 
mechanism of vetoing some essential rules before their enactment (Daniels, 2014; Nicolai 
& Stea, 2014; Walker, 2015; West & Raso, 2012).  
Ex Post Control Mechanisms 
Ex-post- after rules made control implies the legislative oversight mechanisms 
and activities. The principals could make such a controlling activity by setting 
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mechanisms such as reporting from the agencies, monitoring the rulemaking activities by 
oversight offices of committees- otherwise known as policy patrol and through platforms 
of complainant citizens (Balla, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Nau, 2013; 
Sant'Ambrogio, 2011). The ex-post control could include checking if the agencies are 
complying not only with statuary objectives but also with the ex-ante control 
mechanisms. The ex-post control also enables the principals to penalize noncompliances 
of any form (Nicolai & Stea, 2014). 
The Problem of Strict Separation of State Powers 
Though the study will provide a general overview on the Ethiopian federal 
process of delegating legislative power to make rules and to control the extent and proper 
use of the power; it will focus on a single national policy, which is a national identity 
card policy. The following sections discuss why was the principal–agency theory relevant 
to this study.   
Some of the peculiarities of democratic decision-making process include 
separation of duties, the rule of law, accountability of the decision makers and 
transparency of the decision proposes (Fukuyama, 2013; Manning; 2015; Pecaric, 2015). 
Democratic governance has two aspects. These are policy – direction aspect and 
administrative -implementation aspects. According to the principle of separation of 
power, representing, policy-making and oversight, the role is played by the elected 
officials while implementing those laws is the role of appointed official or bureaucratic 
agencies (Cohen, 1971). The elected officials set the public goals at a high level, while 
the bureaucratic agencies, who act like agents implement the policies (Cohan, 1971; 
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Frederickson et al., 2015). The policymakers who are elected officials set the public 
policy goals in broad terms in the form of programs and legislation among other forms 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014).  
 Earliest democratic governance advocates argued that the separation of authority 
should be strict, which means each organ must exercise its inherent power as delegated 
by the people (Iuliano, 2018; Kelley, 2017). For the advocates of strict separation of 
power, the constitutional power of the three of the branches is a delegated power. Hence, 
redelegating the delegated power is unacceptable because re-delegation might lead to 
concentration of authority and additional growth of the executive body (Iuliano, 2018; 
Kelley, 2017; Manning, 2015; Pecaric, 2015). 
Thus, power transfer within the organs had been unwelcomed. However, public 
administration has been showing that strict separation of power is not going to work 
(Iuliano, 2018; Kelley, 2017). A delegation of legislative powers is becoming standard 
practice (Clark & Leiter; 2011). The dynamism of current governance is one of the 
causes of the legislative organs to delegate some of its powers to make laws and policies 
mainly to the executive branch (Kerwin& Furlong, 2011). Rulemaking must be flexible 
to address dynamic issues, such as demand for good governance, the unpredictable 
threats to national security and technological advent.  
However, it is tough for legislators who traditionally lack such flexibility to make 
laws and revisions fast. Legislative sessions are full of contests, and they are too 
procedural. The decision to make laws is the longest and too procedural. The legislative 
organ is mostly a stage of different ideological and policy contests. On the contrary, the 
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executive, which mostly led by the ruling party is relatively uniform and fast in decision 
making. Thus, it has been standard practice for the legislator to formulate general policies 
and delegate some power mainly to the administrative body which formulates detail rules 
(Clark & Leiter; 2011; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
Another vital reason for delegating the authority to make rules is the ever-growing 
technicality of regulations. Some regulations need specialized knowledge. For example, 
security measures in the aviation industry, food and drug regulations, environmental and 
health-related rules need specialized knowledge that the legislators mostly lack. Thus, 
adopting such technical regulations are relatively easy for public agencies. Federal 
agencies established for specific missions have the capacity and resources to formulate 
rules that regulate industries that are rich in technicalities. Thus, asking the legislature to 
adopt all levels of laws and policies to all modern administrative areas will be difficult. 
Therefore, establishing a delegation of legislative powers is becoming indisputable. The 
only thing, which is disputable is related to the extent and form of delegation and the way 
the delegated power is controlled (Clark &Leiter; 2011; Kerwin& Furlong, 2011). 
As noted earlier the executive branch, whom its primary task is actualizing public 
policy into reality, has the actual power (Cohen, 1971). When the legislators granted to 
the executive the power to make rules, the power of the executive becomes more actual 
(Mooney, 2012). After citizens granted their power to the government in the form of 
delegation, they stand on the defensive side, when the government violates their rights. 
They should protect their liberties and freedom from the government. However, the issue 
becomes so severe when the legislative organs delegate some of their legislative power to 
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the executive, which enables the executive to have a legislative authority (Daniels, 2014; 
Walker, 2015). 
The Genesis of Delegation of Legislative Powers 
In 1767 John Lock postulated the concept of nondelegation of a delegated power 
(Manning, 2015). The idea of redelegation presupposes that the constitutional power of 
the legislator itself is a delegated power. The legislative delegation, in this case, seems 
the antithesis of democracy and the principles of separation of power. The reason for 
nondelegation doctrine was based on the fact that the legislatures only have a delegated 
power from the people. Therefore, it was treated as a negation of democracy and a new 
way of power consolidation at the hands of the executive branch (Cass, 2016; Iuliano, 
2018; Kelley, 2017; Manning, 2015; Mishra, 2015). 
However, in the USA after the great depression, the executive needed much 
power to tackle the economic problems. The executive was delegated with much power 
to resolve the crisis. The time of the economic crises was equated with a time of war. As 
in the date of war, the president, and other executive departments needed much power to 
defeat the enemy, which was the economic crisis. The extension of the executive power 
to rulemaking has been growing since the great depression. Mainly the delegation-
nondelegation controversy shifted into the how much, to what extent and what form of 
delegation (Elias, 2016; Iuliano, 2018; Kelley, 2017; Manning, 2015; Pecaric, 2015). 
 In the United States, the constitutionality of delegation was controversial; it is 
through judicial interpretations and decision that became standard practices (Iuliano, 
2018; Kelley, 2017; Manning, 2015). However, in Ethiopia, the concept of delegation of 
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legislative powers is stipulated in the constitution (Degol; Kedir, 2013). So the argument 
is not authorization administrative bodies to make rules per se but the extent and doctrine 
of the authorization and the control of its application (Weaver; 2014). Thus it will be 
useful first, to discuss the nature and extent of power delegation. 
Delegation of Legislative Powers and Rules 
Administrative rulemaking includes creating new rules, amending, and repealing 
current rules (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Sabasiter, 2014). Rules might be categorized as 
constitutive, regulative rules, and be explained in three forms. Constitutive rules are rules 
that create new activities, new institutions, and entities. On the other hand, regulative 
rules are rules that regulate existing behaviors and activities such as traffic regulation. 
The three forms of regulations are substantive, procedural and interpretive rules (Antony, 
1992; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
 Substantive rules are important because they create, repeal or extend rights and 
duties, or they might replace existing rights, privileges, and obligations. Thus the power 
to make substantive rules is the most critical power regarding sensitivity (Antony, 1992; 
Kerwin & Furlong, 2011).  
Some scholars argue that the legislative branch should not authorize public 
agencies to formulate substantive rules because creating rights and duties must remain at 
the hand of the legislatures (Iuliano, 2018; Kelley, 2017; Manning, 2015; Pecaric, 2015). 
On the contrary, others argue that the purpose of substantive rights is not to create 
fundamental rights or duties, their purpose is to help the application of already approved 
general public policies (Clark & Leiter; 2011; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). However, 
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regardless of the argument, it is common practice, and in some countries such as 
Ethiopia, it is constitutional to transfer the power to make all forms of rules (Degol & 
Kedir, 2013). 
The second form of rules is the procedural rule. The procedural rule does not 
create new rights and duties or repealing existing rules. However, procedural rules 
determine the mode of operation and timetables that dictate when and how citizens can 
get access to their rights. Procedural rules can also change, amend or repeal the existing 
procedural prescriptions. Since procedural rules determine the implementation of new 
regulations and the way the substantive rights could be exercised, so their importance is 
sensible (Antony, 1992; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). 
The third form of rules is interpretive rules. Interpretive rules might include none-
legislative or nonbinding policy statements, notices, guidelines, and circulation. 
However, the focus of this study is on interpretive rules that have legislative force or 
force of law. Mostly, interpretive rules are statements produced by the public agency or 
ministerial office to explain ambiguous regulations and some clauses in them. Thus, 
interpretive rules are necessary when there are conflicting and unclear clauses or sections 
(Antony, 1992; Kerwin& Furlong, 2011). However, if uncontrolled, the agencies can 
abuse the vagueness of regulation to extend power in the name of interpretation (Daniels, 
2014; Walker; 2015). So it is a discretion power of the body of the legislature to 
authorize administrative bodies to pass any form of the rules after the formulation of the 
necessary policies.  
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Thus, the legislative body is expected to do two things. One it should formulate 
the public policy issue and leave rooms for the administrators to enact rules according to 
the demand of dynamism and flexibility of the matter (Kerwin & Furlong, 2011). On the 
other hand, legislators should set mechanisms to control delegated power (Walker; 2015). 
Delegation doctrine deals with the strictness and broadness of the delegation and the 
nature and extent of the delegation, and legislative guidelines.   
Current Political Governance in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is one of the oldest nation-states in the world (Karbo, 2013). There is at 
least more than 3000 years of recorded history without interruption. Ethiopia is located in 
the Horn of Africa, which is one of the volatile parts of the world. The geopolitical 
position of the country necessitates a unique approach in many aspects. It is a 
neighboring country to the Middle East. Its people speak the Afro- Asiatic languages 
(Abbink, 2014). Ethiopia is the only African country that has its alphabet and calendar. It 
is the only country that accepted and legitimized Judaism as its religion since the 10
th
 
century before Christ, and there are many domestic followers of Judaism. The country 
declared Christianity as a state religion in the first half of the 4
th
 century until it lasted in 
the 1974 communist revolution (Karbo, 2013). 
 One of the uniqueness about Ethiopia is that it is the first country in the world 
even before the Makah and Medina (now parts of Saudi Arabia) to recognize Islam as a 
legitimate religion. Mohamed, the Prophet of Islam, sent his families and followers 
including his daughter to Ethiopia when his tribe in Makah persecuted him and his 
supporters. The then Ethiopian Christian king legitimized Islam as one of Ethiopia‘s 
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religions. Since then Islam and Christianity have been living side by side peacefully, and 
prophet Mohamed prohibited Muslims from waging jihad against Ethiopia on a religious 
basis. In Islamic tradition waging jihad against Christian Ethiopians are taboo (Abbink, 
2014, Erlich, 2013). However, regardless of its long and unified history, Ethiopia is full 
of diversity. There are about 80 ethnic groups with their unique languages. Christianity 
and Islam are essential religions and covers 62.8% and 33.8% of the population, 
respectively. There are other religious minorities too (Abbink, 2014; Karbo, 2013; 
Haustein & Østebø, 2011). 
The other thing about Ethiopia is that a dynasty had ruled it that claimed to have 
descended from the same line for hundreds of years until public unrest in 1974 overthrew 
the last emperor. After the last empower was dethroned, a military junta came to power 
under the banner of communist ideology. Ethiopians were successful when it comes to 
defending their country from foreign invaders. In the era of the colony, Ethiopia was the 
only free country in Africa (Abbink, 2014). However, when it comes to democracy and 
democratic freedom, Ethiopians had been too tolerant until the 1960s 1970s. At the end 
of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, Ethiopian students, farmers, military officers, 
and other section of the society demonstrated for democratic governance and more 
freedom. Because the movement was disorganized, the military took power and declared 
the socialist ideology as the political ideology of its government. The regime had 
prohibited any form of political activism and a multi-party system. The military junta 
held power for 17 years. After the declaration of one party system, different student 
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groups raised arms and started fighting the regime (Abbink, 2014; Bach, 2011; Ibrahim, 
2014). This brought down the military junta in 1991. 
Immediately after the fall of the military regime, a three-year transitional 
government was established. After three years of transition, in 1995, the new constitution 
was adopted. The new constitution introduced a new federated republic under the name 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. According to the new constitution, the 
federation comprises nine regional states and one autonomous city administration. The 
new constitution created two levels of governments that are the federal government and 
regional state governments (Alemu, 2015). 
 The new constitution covered the internationally accepted human rights 
stipulated in modern international human rights the universal human rights declaration, 
the international convention on civil and political rights and the international convention 
on social, cultural and economic rights. According to article 10 sub article 1 of the 1995 
constitution, human rights and freedoms emanate from the nature of humanity, so that 
they are inviolable and inalienable. According to constitution human rights can only be 
limited by criminal activities, the rights of others, national security, public order, and 
well-being of the youth (House of Peoples Representatives, 1995)  
On the other hand, the constitution put limits on the power of the government. For 
example, it is stipulated in article nine of the constitution that any law, customary 
practice, or decision by state organ or public offices that contravene the constitution shall 
be null and void. The point is any law enacted or any court verdict rendered alternatively, 
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a decision made by violating human rights and freedoms of persons will be considered as 
if it does not exist. 
Article 13 sub-article 2 of the constitution also dictated that the fundamental 
human rights stipulated in the very constitution must be interpreted in the manner and 
principles of the 1948 universal declaration of human rights and other international 
human rights‘ convention ratified by the country. The same constitution stipulated in 
article 11 about the accountability of the government. According to article 11 of the 
constitution, the conduct of the government must be transparent. At the same time, any 
public official or representative shall be accountable in case of failure in his official 
duties. In the case of loss of confidence, the public has a right to recall its representative. 
According to article 55(17) of the constitution, the parliament has the power to call and 
investigate all government officials including the prime minister in the case of 
misconduct.  
 The constitution has various unique features. One of its unique features is that the 
constitution in article 62 sub-article 1granted the power to resolve any constitutional 
dispute, not to courts but the house of the federation. According to article 61(1) of the 
constitution, the house of federation represents the nations, nationalities and peoples 
groups in the federated states. The house is not lawmaking but constitutional disputes 
interpreting body. So, any law enacted by the parliament, any verdict rendered by a court, 
or any decision made by the executive can be reviewed by the house of the Federation 
(Bach, 2011, Ibrahim, 2014; Lefort, 2014). The constitutions created two levels of 
governance. According to article 50 (1), the federation comprises federal government and 
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regional states governments. These are nine regional states and one administration. The 
nine federated regional states are mainly established on the following criteria. According 
to Article 39 (4) (e), the elements for some groups to be treated as a nation, nationalities, 
and peoples and to have the right to self-determination are the same language, geography, 
the same identity, and psychological makeup (Degol &Kedir, 2013; Twibell, 1999). 
The constitution granted two kinds of rights. These are civil and political rights, 
which are sometimes called negative rights and socio-economic rights such as the right to 
education, health, and the right to get a job. From article 14 to article 44 of the 
constitution, which is two-thirds of the whole constitution, covers the civil and political 
rights and socio-economic and cultural rights. The socio-economic rights include the 
right to education, health, and development. The Ethiopian constitution is somehow a 
combination of socialist and liberal political economy concepts. In this kind of hybrid 
governance system, the government has two forms of duties.  
The first duty is that the government must protect the right of citizens and enforce 
laws and policies, which is a minimum task of every form of government. The other thing 
is the government must provide underlying social, economic commodities and services. It 
is a constitutional right for citizens to get access to education, health and job, and another 
economic right. For the government to be able to provide such services and commodities, 
in addition to its regular government service, it must have an income. In Ethiopia, 
because the government could not collect enough money from tax and customs, it owns 
banks, air, land, marine, and transport cooperation, hotels, industries, and health centers 
(Degol & Kedir, 2013; Ibrahim, 2014; Twibell, 1999). The point of the constitution 
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discussion is that on the one hand, the constitution guaranteed fundamental human rights 
with moderate responsibilities; on the contrary, it creates governments whose power is 
constitutionality limited  by the rule of law.    
Delegation of Legislative Powers in Ethiopia 
In the Ethiopian constitution, there are two forms of delegation. One the federal 
government can delegate some of its constitutional power to the federated regional states, 
which means the legislators can delegate their legislative authority to regional states. 
Article 50(9) of the Constitution gave power to the federal government to delegate its 
powers to the regional state when necessary. Article 77(13) gave power to the cabinet to 
enact regulations if authorized by the body of the lawmakers. According to the sub-
article, the council can formulate regulations when the legislature authorized it to do so. 
The subarticle did not put any condition or guidelines as to the form and level of the 
delegation. The power to delegate and the nature of delegations left to the parliament to 
decide.  
 The house of federation does not have any lawmaking power, except legislative 
review over legislation promulgated by the parliament. The parliament, which is the 
single House, has political and legislative supremacy over all state institutions. Thus, 
delegating a legislative power either to the cabinet or directly to the ministerial offices or 
agencies is an absolute power of the parliament. That constitution is silence about 
authorization of public agencies and courts to make rules. However, there are many 
instances, where the legislative body authorized public agencies and rare occasions where 
the legislative body authorized a federal court to make rules (Degol & Kedir, 2013). 
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Lawmaking Process in Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, the state is constituted by a federal government and nine regional 
governments. Each layer of governments has legislative, executive and judiciary powers 
in their spheres as stipulated in article 50, 51 and 52 of the constitution. Each of the 
federal and member states exercises legislative, executive and judicial powers. When it 
comes to the federal government, there is the concept of separation of power, but there is 
no principle of balance of power because the parliament is the highest body. Article 50 
sub article 3 of the constitution declared that the parliament is the supreme authority of 
the federation and each state council (state legislative body) is the highest organ on each 
state matters.  
Article 59(2) of the constitution stipulated that the house of people‘s 
representative shall adopt working rules and procedures as a guide to its internal activities 
including the law and policy-making process (Alemu, 2015). Accordingly, the parliament 
enacted internal working procedure and members‘ code of conduct regulation 6, 2016. 
According to article 50 of the regulation, lawmaking includes enacting new laws, 
amending or repealing existing laws, ratifying international agreements, and passing 
resolutions (House of People‘s Representatives, 2016). Article 51 of the regulation 
stipulates that initiating draft legislation is mainly the task of the executive; however, 
initiating finance-related laws is exclusively the power of the executive. In other matters, 
parliamentarians can individually or in group initiate laws (Alemu, 2015; Degol & Kedir, 
2013). 
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Articles 51 and 52 of the house regulation stipulated that all forms of laws 
whoever imitates them, they should be presented in English and Amharic versions along 
with short explanatory documents to the parliament through the office of the house 
speaker. Then first it must be distributed to members of the parliament for first reading. 
In the first reading, a general debate on the content and purpose of the draft law must be 
held. Then if the house accepts the general objective of the proposal, it refers it to the 
relevant standing committee or joint committee for further study and scrutiny. The 
standing committee calls all stakeholders for open hearing and debate on the draft. 
During the public hearing, the standing committee might consult the agency or the 
minister who initiates the law for further examination, and the committee might revise the 
law and present are to the parliament for the second reading. Then after discussing the 
report by the standing committee, the parliament decides whether the bill must be passed 
or not. It can be passed as it is, it can be rejected or can be approved with some revisions 
(House of People‘s Representatives, 2016).   
Chapter Summary 
From the review in the literature, I learned that rulemaking is at the heart of public 
administration. Thus avoiding rulemaking is not in the option. However, as a necessary 
authority, it should be securitized because the monopoly of power of any form is the 
antithesis to the rule of law and accountabilities.  
 Studies showed that administrative agencies used delegated legislative power to 
promote their interest, policy preferences and they inclined to serve the industries they 
regulate than the public interest. They use their information superiority and technical 
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sophistication to insulate themselves from scrutiny by the public and the principals. They 
also use non-statutory action, inaction and action delay as a way of non- compliance, and 
abuse of the delegated legislative power.     
 In response to the behavior of the administrative agencies, the lawmakers 
developed different ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms. Some of the mechanisms 
include setting delegation doctrines, placing institutional and legal platforms of control, 
using vetoing power and mandatory participatory. Reporting and patrolling are some of 
the ex- post control mechanisms. Since the studies are conducted mostly in the western 
democracies, the literature gap considering the Ethiopian situation is extensive.  
The nature of the study will be qualitative. In order to narrow the existing gap, 
this will be using the case study methods relevant to the case of Ethiopia. The next 
chapter will address the methodology used in this study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain the research design, central concept definition, and 
participant selection, the role of the researcher, data collection procedures, and data 
analysis mechanisms. I also explain procedures and issues related to the trustworthiness 
of data and ethicality of the treatment of participants. Notably, the focus of the inquiry 
was about delegating legislative power to make rules and to oversee their 
implementation.  
To know the legality, extent, nature and the oversight and other political control 
mechanisms in the delegating rulemaking process, I analyzed the mechanisms in a 
context of Proclamation 760/ 2012, the registration of vital events and national identity 
card proclamation. 
In this chapter, I address the choice of the qualitative case study as research 
design and discuss the central concept of the study and the tradition of the study. I also 
address my role as a researcher along with the possible sources of biases on my side 
because of personal or professional relations with participants.  
Furthermore, in this chapter, I address issues such as population size, sampling 
strategy, and participant selection criteria. As part of the discussion of the methodology 
of data collection, I address data collection instruments. I discuss the analysis plan and 
the connection between data and the research question. The chapter also addresses issues 
of trustworthiness such as credibility, dependency, transferability, and ethical concerns.  
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Research Design and Rationale 
Research Questions 
The central RQ for this qualitative study was:  
RQ: What strategies would ensure an effective political control for preventing 
possible abuse of power and noncompliance in the process of rulemaking in 
Ethiopia?  
The subquestions that helped to guide further the inquiry were: 
SQ1: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on delegating 
rulemaking power? 
SQ2: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on the issue of 
political control and accountability?   
SQ3: What are the ex-ante/ex-post political control mechanisms in the rulemaking 
process?  
Key Concepts 
The central concepts of the study were delegation doctrine, legislative delegation, 
polarity management, and rulemaking. 
Delegation doctrine: Delegation doctrine is a principle or guidelines that 
lawmakers set to manage the process and implementation of legislative delegation. The 
principles include the broadness and narrowness of delegation and the kind of 
mechanisms established to oversee the rulemaking process (Manning, 2015). 
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Legislative delegation: Delegation of legislative powers a process of transferring 
lawmaking power from the lawmakers to the executive body or its branches and the 
judiciary (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015). 
Legislative oversight: Legislative oversight is a set of policies, mechanisms, and 
actions that lawmakers use to control the proper exercise of the delegated legislative 
power (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Walker, 2015).  
Rulemaking: Rulemaking is a process of promulgating regulation and directives 
by the executive body with the power vested in it by the lawmakers (Kerwin & Furlong, 
2011). 
Identifying the Research Tradition 
The central focus of this study was to explore what strategies would ensure 
effective political control of the administrative agencies regarding rulemaking without 
affecting their autonomy in the case of Ethiopia. Thus, the qualitative research approach 
was relevant in exploring and understanding the meaning of the social problem 
profoundly and comprehensively (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015). 
I collected interview data from members of the parliament who had been active at 
least since the previous term and the executive officials who participated in the legislative 
drafting process as experts and coordinators. I triangulated the interview data by 
analyzing legislative texts in the relevant legislation regarding principals‘ political control 
mechanisms. Thus, the nature of the inquiry and the nature of the data that I collected 
dictated that a qualitative approach was the right approach (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015; 
Yin, 2014). 
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The Relevance of Case Study 
After choosing a qualitative approach to the study, the next step was to determine 
the type of qualitative approach most relevant from the qualitative study traditions. 
Several qualitative approaches were considered, including phenomenology and grounded 
theory as presented by Creswell (2013), Rudestam and Newton (2015), and Saldaña 
(2013). To clarify the bias of why a case study is appropriate in this case while there are 
many qualitative approaches within the qualitative tradition, the answer is: when a study 
tries to address a single process and single case, a case study becomes the most relevant 
approach (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Rudestam & Newton, 2015; Yin, 2014).  
In addition to the questions the researcher intends to address, Yin (2014) added 
two other parameters for selecting the case study. The first one is the extent of control the 
researcher has on the situation. The case study must be conducted on contemporary cases 
as opposed to the historical case. However, the researcher in the case study must not be 
able to manipulate the situation (Yin, 2014). This study was focused on a crucial decision 
process by the highest political organ in the country.  
The second parameter for choosing the case study tradition is the 
contemporariness of the event. Though the delegation of legislative powers and the 
rulemaking process have started in the past, it is ongoing. Therefore, the case study 
approach was the appropriate approach for this research. 
Role of the Researcher 
One of the features that differentiate a qualitative strategy from the quantitative 
strategy is related to the role of the researcher. Unlike the quantitative strategy where the 
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role of the researcher is limited to that of an observer, in qualitative studies the researcher 
plays a crucial role in the research process. If not controlled and carefully monitored, the 
instrumental power of the researchers could be a source of bias and breach of ethics 
(Creswell, 2013; Miles, Huberman, &Saldaña, 2014).The researcher is the one who 
designs the research, which of course will have an impact on the research process. Also, 
the researcher typically selects the sources of the data and analyzes those data.  
As a qualitative researcher, I designed the research, and I collected the data. Then 
I created an intimacy with the data and made sense of the patterns in those data and tried 
to create meaning. However, I tried to be as objective as possible in the process. To 
minimize personal biases, I applied all relevant data analysis mechanisms such as coding, 
categorizing and theming, and limited member checking (Rudestam & Newton 2015; 
Yin, 2014).  
For the last 10 years, I have been working as a policy and legal researcher and 
director of cyberlaw and policy research in one of the public agencies of the federal 
government of Ethiopia. I have led a team and personally participated in drafting policies 
and legislation. In some instances, I have defended proposals in front of lawmakers. Such 
cases have created an opportunity for me to know some of these lawmakers in person, 
and a chance to give short-term training related to these legislative actions. However, 
none of the participants had prior individual engagement with me. 
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Methodology 
Population, Sample Size, and Selection Logic 
I used two sources of data for this study. These were interview data and document 
data. I interviewed active parliamentarians who were members of the Ethiopian federal 
body of lawmakers and sitting for the 4th and 5th term from 2010 to 2020. The Ethiopian 
Parliament has 547 seats. About 30 of those 547 members hold executive offices (House 
of People‘s Representatives, n.d.). Thus, the population is about 500 members of the 
parliament. I was convinced that interviewing five parliamentarians would reach the point 
of saturation because the purpose was to search for the shared understandings of the 
parliamentarians (see Patton, 2015). I interviewed five officials from the executive 
branch. In 2011, the Ethiopian prime minister formed a national screening committee 
composed of ministers and agency heads to lead the registration of vital events and 
national identity card program. The steering committee, in turn, established a committee 
of middle-level officials from the ministry of justices, now the office of the Attorney 
General (House of People‘s Representatives, 2012b) Thus the five executive officials 
were either members of a steering committee or had knowledge about drafting  process of  
the registration of vital events and national identity card program. 
I had a total of 10 participants. The documents data included the legislation itself, 
parliamentarian‘s code of conduct and lawmaking process regulation, and subsequent 
subordinate legislation formulated to implement the identity proclamations.  
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Sampling Strategy 
The parliamentarian participants were those who had a seat at least in the previous 
and current terms (2010–2020). I mainly focused on the parliamentarians who were 
members of the national security and of the legal and justice affairs standing committees 
because they have particular relevance to the legislation central to the case. On the 
administrative side, I focused on members of the steering committee who looked over the 
legislative drafting process of the identity legislation and employees of the Attorney 
General who participated in the drafting process of the legislation. Patton (2015) called 
such sampling purposive sampling.   
Criteria for Participation 
The Ethiopian parliament is organized into different standing committees, one of 
which is Legal and Justice Affairs Standing Committee. The role of this standing 
committee is to oversee all legal, justice, and administration-related proposals before 
their approval. The standing committee consults the public and organizes public hearings 
before the approval of proposals. I focused on the National Security Standing Committee 
for they have the power to review legislation connected to national security. Thus, I gave 
priority to members of the two standing committees. On the administrative side, I focused 
on the National Steering Committees established by the Office of the Prime Minister to 
look over the national program and the process of the legislation and the drafting 
committee from the Ministry of Justices, now the office of the Attorney General. The 
second important criterion was volunteering for the participation; no participant was in 
any way forced or felt obligated to participate in the study. 
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Participants and the Criteria 
I formally asked the Office of the House Speaker through my sponsor to obtain 
access to the office of the parliament. However; I directly contacted the executive 
officials in their respective offices. I presented a letter of invitation to each participant 
along with the consent form. 
Saturation Point and Sample Size 
Deciding on what number of participants is enough to elicit the necessary data is 
not an easy task. Patton (2015) supported the idea that there is no clear mechanism in 
qualitative research for deciding the sample size. However, the principle is that the 
sample size must be meaningful and reliable. Thus, assuming the fact that most 
delegation of legislative powers regarding the legislation is formally discussed and every 
potential participant is free to present his opinion, I interviewed 10 lawmakers and 
appointed officials from the executive branch.  
Instrumentation 
Data Collection Instrument 
As previously mentioned, the sources of the data for this study were interview 
data and document data. I interviewed members of parliament and appointed officials 
who participated in the drafting and passing of the legislation under study. The first 
instrument then was semistructured interview questions. I audio recorded the interviews. 
In the documents data category, I reviewed the legislation and other subordinate 
legislation, parliaments working procedures, and other supportive documents. 
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Source of Data Collection Instruments 
For the semistructured interviews, I prepared an interview protocol along with 
semi-structured interview question formats. According to Jacob (2012), there are three 
types of interview questions. These are general, structured, and semi-structured. General 
questioning might create an unmanageable situation, and conversely, structured 
questioning might limit flexibility and limiting information gleaned. I developed my 
interview protocol (see Appendix A) based on logical steps recommended by Crewel 
(2013), Jacob (2012), Rudestam and Newton (2015), and Turner (2010). 
To conduct the interview, I tried to select a setting free of disturbances and 
distractions such as the offices of each participant and any place of the participants 
choice.I then explained to the interviewee the purpose of the interview and why the 
person is participating in it. Then I addressed the issue of confidentiality and anonymity 
of the individual‘s name. I explained the format of the interview and notified each 
participant that I the interview was to be recorded. Furthermore, I explained how long the 
interview would take. I explained my readiness and availability to each interviewee on 
the matter of the questioning. Finally, I asked the participants if they have any questions 
they would like to ask me and are free to refuse to answer any question they are not 
comfortable with.  
Data Face Value Validity 
To make sure that all forms of data collected from the legislation, other 
documents, and the interview are valid at face value level, I took the following steps. In 
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relation, to the legislative documents, I confirmed the validity of each law considered in 
this study to avoid the repeal of some legislation (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014). 
The second part of the document data consists of official memos, minutes, and 
other parliamentary working procedures and regulations. Therefore, to make sure that the 
data sources are valid, I checked the authenticity of each documents bearing the right 
signature and stamps on it. Since the interview data could be affected in the process of 
transcription, I tried to give the valid transcribed data to each interviewee (Birt, Scott, 
Cavers, Campbell, &Walker, 2016; Harvey, 2015). 
Data Collection Procedures 
I had one central question and three sub-questions. I collected the data to answer 
mainly the central question and its elaborative sub-questions. I referenced document data 
to triangulate and ensure the validity of the study.  
I conducted the interview personality by audio recording the interview and 
transcribing it. I met with participants at least twice. First, through a phone call and then I 
met them in person to conduct the interview. I saw two participants to give the 
transcribed data for counter checking because the rest were not interested to counter 
check. 
Data Analysis 
After data collection, the next important step was analyzing the data and obtaining 
the input from it. As a researcher, I collected data then analyzed, presented and 
interpreted the data. To conduct the analysis I had to make sure collected data was valid 
at face value making sure that they are up to the standard; the first step was data 
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organization. Data organization according to Creswell (2013) is one of the first steps, 
qualitative research must take. I transcribed and edited the interview data. I organized the 
document data in a logical and time sensible manner. Then I followed the points step by 
step.  
First, I created intimacy with the data. Data intimacy was the result of reading, 
thoroughly through and studying the data (Saldaña, 2013; Yin, 2014) Therefore; I 
skimmed over the data and then read them thoroughly and critically until I was well 
acquainted. The second step was coding. Coding, is an analytical process and helpful in 
facilitating data analysis and interpretation. The coding contributed to study the distinct 
concepts, structures, hierarchies, and relationships within in the data (Creswell, 2013; 
Patton, 2015; Rudestam and Newton, 2015; Saldaña, 2013). Coding according to 
Saldaña, (2013) is part of the analyses process. However, coding, which is often 
represented by a word or short phrase holds the summative essence of a part of the text, 
whether it is transcribed text or document text. These are known as precording and non-
structured (Jacob, 2012, Rudestam and Newton, 2015; Saldaña, 2013).   
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Table 1  
Preliminary Value Coding and Analysis Framework 
Theme Category Code  Research questions Interview q. 
     
Delegating 
legislative 
power(DLP) 
 
Effectiveness and 
efficiency  ( EE) 
 
 
 
Technical Capability  
(EETC) 
 Flexibility   (EEF) 
Organizational reediness 
(EEOR)   
 Time and Adaptability 
(EETA)    
CQ  Sec. A &sec. B 
    
 
Applicability of policies 
( AP) 
Detailed rules ( APDR) 
Informed rules( APIR) 
Contextualized rules  
CQ 
 
 Sec. A & B 
Autonomy (A) Law and order (ALO) 
 
 
 
Power monopoly(APM) 
Stability(AS) 
Sense of security(ASS) 
Predictable future(APF) 
CQ  Sec. A & B 
     
Law enforcement (ALE) 
 
Crime control (ACC) 
Preventing terrorism(ALE) 
Enforcing contracts (AEC) 
Civil liability(ACL) 
CQ Sec. A & B 
    
 
Decisiveness 
(ARD) 
Timely decision (RTD) 
Effectiveness(RE1) 
Efficiency (RE2) 
Dynamism (RD) 
Service delivery( SD) 
              CQ Sec. A & C 
               Table continue    
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Them 
 
Category 
  
Code 
 
 
Research question 
 
Interview 
question 
 
Political 
Control 
Accountability of 
government(PCAG) 
Reporting ( PCAGR) 
Patrolling(( PCAGP) 
Fair Arming (PCAGFA) 
 Sec B. 
   
    
 
Rule of law ( RL)  Lawfulness( RLF) 
Compliance (RLC) 
 
  
Delegation 
doctrine (D)   
Broad delegation- 
(DBD)   
Free of condition (DFC) 
Time insensitive(DTI)  
No incentive(DNI) 
week oversight (DWO)  
Free of restriction(DFR) 
All rule(DAR) 
CQ&SQ Sec. D 
 
Narrow delegation 
(DND)  
Conditional(DC) 
Time oriented(DCTR)  
Incentivized(DI1) 
Interpretive and procedural 
rules(DIP)  
CQ &SQ Sec. D 
 strict oversight mechanisms 
(DSOM)   
  
Oversight mechanisms 
(DOM)   
 
Legislative(DL) 
Judicial review (DJR) 
Legal and procedural(DLP)  
Institutional(DI2) 
Technological(DT) 
Accountability(DA) 
Rewordings (DR) 
De- authorization( DD) 
CQ&SQ Sec.D 
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The structured precoding approach is applicable when the following three 
conditions exist. The first pre-coding structured approach is provisional coding, which a 
researcher uses preliminary data to set codes before he collected the actual data (Miles, 
Huberman & Saldaña, 2014). The second precoding approach is hypothesis coding when 
the researcher uses to confirm or disconfirm pre-existing theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks. The third precoding approach is protocol coding (Miles, Huberman & 
Saldaña, 2014). I chose the hypothetical coding for its appropriateness among the three 
options. Therefore, I developed the following preliminary coding framework to have a 
picture. 
Even though I tried to make sense of the future by designing a preceding 
framework, I coded the data after reading and getting the essence of each part of the text. 
According to Miles, Huberman and Saldaña (2014), and Saldaña, (2013) there are two 
levels of post data collection coding. The first cycle coding method helps to assign a code 
to the data chunks.  
Among the lists of the first coding, I selected value coding strategy, because value 
coding was relevant as the primary data was interview data depicting the perception of 
the participants. While the first cycle helps to transform the chunk file into relevant text, 
the second cycle coding, which works based on the result of the first coding, leads to 
study the distinct concepts, patterns, structures, hierarchies and relationships within the 
data. In the second cycle level consists of my identification of the categories and the 
themes. 
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Trustworthiness 
The concept of trustworthiness in qualitative research implies the soundness of 
qualitative research and its worthiness (Creswell, 2013; Jacob, 2012, Rudestam and 
Newton, 2015; Saldaña, 2013). Trustworthiness is a value of the research result, which is 
a response from reviewers of the research result. Therefore, trustworthiness is a result of 
cumulative of credibility, transferability, and dependability of the research result (Patton, 
2015). The credibility is the result of an evaluation of whether the research findings are 
the theological induction of the raw data (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015; Yin 2014).  
The first element of trustworthiness is credibility, which relates to the internal 
validity of the research. I guaranteed the integrity of the interview data by transcribing 
them carefully and ask the interviewees to read transcribed data and check it (Birt, Scott, 
Cavers, Campbell, &Walker, 2016; Harvey, 2015). Additionally, I used data triangulation 
methods mainly when factual claims existed in the interview data as triangulation is one 
of the strategies of ensuring credibility (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015; Yin, 2014).  
Another essential element of trustworthiness is transferability. Transferability 
means the possibility of applicability of the research result to other similar areas. For the 
research to be transferable, I integrated the processes of data collection, data analysis, and 
presentation (Shenton, 2005; Creswell, 2013). Another major factor for qualitative 
research to be trustworthy is its conformability. Conformability is a measure relationship 
between the research finding and the relevant data. The point is the data must support and 
evidence the result of the study (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015; Shenton, 2005).  
64 
  
Ethical Concerns 
The ethical concern is one of the crucial elements of the research process. The 
reason is the research should not harm in any way the interest of any participant. Harm 
might include physical, psychological, goodwill, economic, and others. The other reason 
to be ethical is academic honesty, which includes plagiarism and conflict of interest 
(American Psychological Association, 2010; Creswell, 2014; Miles, Huberman & 
Saldaña, 2014, Rudestam& Newton, 2015; O‘Sullivan, Rassel &Berner, 2008). To avoid 
unethicality in all aspects, I duly followed all ethical concerns mentioned in the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) documents and the cited literature.  
Where there I sensed an issue of ethical concern, I tried to calculate potential 
harm in comparison to the expected benefits. I weighed the balance between the benefits 
I intended to gain and possible harms I may incur on the participants and other third 
parties (Rudestam, & Newton, 2015). To avoid unethicality, I took the following 
measures. 
First, all document data that I used are public documents; thus, I cited and used all 
the data in a manner I mentioned in the data analyses part. Regarding the interview data, I 
formally asked the office of House speaker and to get access and obtained permission 
from the office of the standing committee. I gave the letter of invitation to potential 
participating individuals. I then presented a consent form for signature for all who 
volunteered to participate. I had the full support of my sponsor throughout this process. 
I made sure that no vulnerable person is on the list because their participation is 
not essential. In the process, I respected the privacy of the participants by not intruding to 
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their private issues unrelated to the research. I have kept the confidentiality of the 
information of the participants by not disclosing intentionally or negligently to any third 
party. I also tried to respect the anonymity of the participants by not leaving any link 
between the data and the identity of the participants. I made sure that I remain 
academically honest all the time in the process, particularly in the data collection and data 
analyses process. Finally, I carefully checked any case with conflict of interest in the 
process (O‘Sullivan, Rassel, &Berner, 2008; Rudestam, & Newton, 2015). 
Overall, I strictly followed all relevant ethical procedures in the design, in the data 
collection process, data analysis, and data dissemination. I observed all established 
relevant ethical standards.  
Chapter Summary 
Chapter three of the study restated the restatement of the problem and the research 
questions. I discussed the type of research design and the rationale for its selection. I 
discussed the role of the researcher as a data collector, data analyst, and an interpreter. In 
this chapter, I discussed the type of data I intended to collect and the data collection 
instrument I intended to use. I discussed data analysis strategies. Along with the data 
analysis strategies, I explained my strategies for ensuring data validity to prove the 
credibility of the research result. 
The other major issue which I addressed in this chapter is the matter of ethical 
concern. Unethicality might come from violating participants‘ rights aspect, conflict of 
interest and academic dishonesty. The next chapter discusses the data collection process, 
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the result of the data analysis, and interpretation. Finally, the chapter discusses the take 
away from the study and forwards recommendations.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to understand the perception of Ethiopian elected 
and appointed officials on the issue of delegating legislative power, the importance of 
political control, and accountability of officials in case of noncompliance. The means of 
obtaining the perceptions of the lawmakers and executive officials were interviewing 
sampled officials. I referred to legislative documents to cross-check specific factual 
claims by the officials. The interviews were designed in light of a selected national policy 
known as the vital events and national identity card proclamation. In the inquiry, I sought 
to answer the following central RQ and three elaborative SQs: 
RQ: What strategies would ensure an effective political control for preventing a 
possible abuse of power and non- compliance in the process of rulemaking in 
Ethiopia?  
SQ1: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on delegating 
rulemaking powers? 
SQ2: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on the issue of 
political control and accountability?  
SQ3: What are the ex-ante/ex-post political control mechanisms in the rulemaking 
process?  
This chapter is organized in a way to present the personal and organizational 
situations that influenced the results of the data collection process and its interpretation. 
In this chapter, I also discuss the demographic description of the participants. The process 
68 
  
of data collection, its analysis and the tools employed for data analysis are the core issues 
that this chapter addresses. The results of the study present the issue of evidence of 
trustworthiness. This chapter ends with a summary of the key findings. 
Setting of the Study 
For the last 3 years, Ethiopia has been in political unrest. There were 
demonstrations and street action followed by the deaths of hundreds and the destruction 
of properties (Weber, 2018). Finally, the political unrest forced the ruling party to revise 
some of its policies and change its leadership (De Waal, 2018; Weber, 2018). Just four 
months before I started the data collection process and when I was in the process of 
defending the proposal and working for Institutional Review  Board (IRB) approval, 
there was a leadership change in the country. The demonstration and civil disobedience in 
most parts of the country forced the ruling party to change its leaders within the party 
platform and in the government system. As a result, a new prime minister who was 
believed to be a change agent from within the party held the premiership.   
The change in leadership affected the study in many ways. Before the change in the 
leadership, I was promised access to the parliament office to interview any parliamentarian 
who would volunteer. However, because there was a leadership change in parliament 
leadership too, I had to repeat the process of getting permission and support from my 
sponsor. The entire process took about 2 months. I was also promoted to a different 
government position within this time frame. My move affected the support of my sponsor 
who now is no longer my employer. This would have delayed my research considerably 
had both my former and present employers not agreed on the continuation of sponsorship 
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by my former employer. With much effort and negotiation on my side, my research 
continued with minimum delay. 
Though the leadership change and the power transition happened within the same 
party, the new leadership has come with new ideas of freedom and massive policy revision 
in the area of justice. Citizens took the chance to demonize and curse everything related to 
the previous leadership of the party and the government. My fear was the situation might 
influence the perception of some of the participants. However, I learned that the perception 
of the participants was based on real experiences. I did not notice any discrepancies in 
perceptions of those who supported the change and those who did not. I still had to be 
careful not to be biased when interpreting the data as I was part of the change process. 
Demographics 
The participants of the study were from different backgrounds; most of them were 
lawyers. A few were with a background in social studies and one with a technology 
background. As to their academic level, two of them held Ph.D.s, and the rest had 
master‘s degrees. I did not consider age as a factor, but because all of them were still 
actively employed and the pension age is 65, I can confirm that they are all under the age 
of 65. Judging from their physical appearance, the sample group age is a mixture of 
young and middle-aged individuals with some who have studied abroad and others 
nationally educated. Their history of employment ranged from judges, administrators, 
ministers, chairs of standing committees, to teachers and consultants. 
Five of the participants were from the executive, and the other five were members 
of the parliament. The minimum service of the parliamentarians was two terms; some 
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were in the current term, and others had continued from the previous term. All of the 
participants were informed about the overall issue of the inquiry, and particularly on the 
legislation/policy chosen as a case.  
Data Collection 
After the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB (approval number 07-
27-18-0503302), I met with the secretariat of the house speaker, and as we discussed the 
purpose and nature of the study I asked him if he could connect me with some of the 
relevant standing committee chairs and members he thought would be relevant to the 
study. He introduced me to one of the relevant standing committee chairs, who in turn 
introduced me to 10 parliamentarians. I exchanged phone numbers with these 10 
members of the parliament, made an appointment over the phone, and tried to meet them 
in person for an interview. Three of them refused to discuss the legislative part and did 
not want to be bothered because of which I stopped the interview. One told me that he 
was leaving the city and I could see him in the middle of September. Six persons were 
willing to provide information. I interviewed the first five I met, and I was convinced the 
information I obtained was sufficient and did not require further interviews. 
As for participants from the executive offices, I had in mind two officials whom I 
heard were participating in the process of the legislation. I called them and explained to 
them the purpose of the study. They were pleased, and they gave me numbers of other 
individuals who were participants in the proposal writing and other aspects of the 
national identity card program. All of them were willing to cooperate except for one. 
However, I interviewed the first five, and I obtained enough data and did not need to seek 
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more information. I interviewed a total of 10 participants, five from the parliament and 
another five from the executive branch.  
I met with most of them three times, firstly by telephone and secondly in person 
to deliver the invitation letter and to explain the purpose and the nature of the study. 
Some of them were ready to give me the interview at the first meeting. Others wanted 
more time and gave me an appointment. Seven of the participants were interviewed in 
their offices with no disturbance or any external noise. 
One of the participants wanted to be interviewed in my car, which was not 
comfortable with much distraction. Transcribing the data was hard. One other participant 
was interviewed outdoors in a garden. There were music and other external noises, which 
made the transcription challenging as the external noise was recorded while the interview 
was going on. A third participant chose to have the interview in a hotel lounge, which 
was quiet enough for the interview. 
I collected the data through the same instrument, which was a semistructured 
interview protocol. I received valuable feedback at my first interview on the arrangement 
of the interview questions.  First, I asked about the mechanisms of political control. The 
participant said, ―First let me speak about the importance of political control, then I will 
speak about the control mechanisms.‖ The participant's suggestion in reframing my 
questions helped me to notice the illogical arrangement of the questions. In the following 
interviews, I arranged the interview questions in a more logical order.   
As I mentioned earlier, there has been a dramatic change in the country. New 
officials were replacing former officials. The change has been affecting everything, and a 
72 
  
new form of government structure was under study. Thus, I feared that I might not get the 
relevant participants regarding experience which matched my research design. I made all 
efforts to finish all interviews before more changes took place in the bureaucracy. It took 
me 10 days to conduct all the interviews, setting the pace at two interviews some days 
and one or none on other days.  
Data Analysis 
In Chapter 3 of the study, I developed a preliminary coding analysis framework 
based on the literature I reviewed and the theory I used as a lens for the study (Table1). In 
the framework, I guessed possible themes, categories, and codes that I expected. 
Thematic analyses can be theory-driven or data-driven (Javadi & Zarea, 2016; Maguire, 
& Delahunt, 2017). Thus, the approach in this study regarding the thematic analyses was 
a combination of both. On the one hand, I used a framework that was based on the theory 
and the literature that I reviewed; on the other hand, the framework I used was changed 
by emerging codes and themes from the data. Thus, the approach was mixed.   
I developed the framework not from actual data but from the literature review, 
which meant the coding and theme analyses should be flexible and open for emerging 
codes. In the process, I tried to strike a balance between theory-driven and data-driven 
approaches. Theory-driven approach means a deductive approach; the data-driven 
approach means an inductive approach (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). However, though I 
was open and flexible enough to the emerging codes, the preliminary framework was 
helpful in creating a picture in my mind about how to code and organize the data. 
73 
  
In the coding and analysis approach, I followed the six steps formulated by Braun 
and Clarke (2006) as cited in Maguire and Delahunt, (2017). After I transcribed each 
interview, I printed it out, and I read it many times until I felt that I created an intimacy 
with the data and had a sense of its content. Then I used Microsoft Word 2016, and the 
comment menu to code all interviews manually. In the coding process, I used the value 
coding method because the participants were sharing their experiences and their 
recommendations regarding values or usability of limited and controlled power of 
government in rulemaking. I was not searching for the same words but similar if not the 
same ideas and concepts. For example, to explain the misbehavior of administrative 
authorities, different participants used words such as abuse of power, extending power, 
ultravirus, and nonstationary rules. Thus, to find a word or a phrase to represent the same 
concept that presented in different words and phrases, the value coding method was 
relevant. In the coding process, I first coded as many codes as I could; in the second 
process, I refined the codes and came up with the result, which is discussed below.  
I coded the data manually using the track changes in Microsoft Office. Then I 
used the navigation pane to count the frequency for each code. As a final result, I got 49 
codes with 487 appearances. The code with the lowest number of appearances was 
―specific rules‖ which appeared twice, while the frequent code, ―serving the public 
interest,‖ appeared 33 times.  
The next task was to look into the codes for patterns or similarities. For example, 
when I reviewed the codes ―technical capability,‖ ―area expertise,‖ ―organizational 
readiness,‖ ―time,‖ and ―service delivery,‖ I found similarity between codes regarding 
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delivering public services effectively and efficiently. I then named the subtheme or 
category as effectiveness. I followed the same steps and out of the 49 codes I got nine 
categories named as ―effectiveness,‖ ―decisiveness,‖ ―applicability of policies,‖ ―broad 
delegation,‖ ―narrow delegation,‖ ―compliance,‖ ―lawfulness,‖ ―ex- ante control ―and― 
ex-post control mechanisms.‖ 
Similarly, I studied the patterns or similarities the nine categories and grouped 
them into four themes. In the theming process, I focused on the values of the categories 
as I did in the coding and categorizing process (Maguire and Delahunt, 2017). When I 
looked into the categories of ―effectiveness,‖ ―decisiveness,‖ and ―applicability of 
police,‖ I saw the pattern that led to the theme ―delegating legislative power,‖ which 
stresses the importance of delegation. Through the same process,I came up with nine 
categories. I identified four themes named ―delegating legislative power,‖ ―Delegation 
doctrine,‖ ―Political controls benefits,‖ and ―Political control mechanisms.‖ 
The code labeled as ―capacity and courage,‖ is somewhat unique since I could not 
find any literature that discusses parliamentarians have no courage to control and make 
the executive official accountable. In the interview, I learned that the appointed officials 
are more courageous and willful to criticize the defects in the system and support stronger 
parliament than the parliamentarians. I will address this issue in details in the result 
section. 
 Some control mechanism such as judiciary, cabinet and administrative review 
mechanisms were generated from the data and were not analyzed since they are out of the 
scope of this study. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are an essential part of the regulatory 
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quality system, which reveals the limitation of the study and hence became one of the 
crucial parts of the recommendation. 
Then I compared the code, categories, and themes in the preliminary data coding 
analyses formwork in chapter three. I saw emerging themes, categories and codes. I 
developed the same framework to display the new themes; categories‘ and codes as 
displayed in the result discussion section (Table 2). To show the relationships between 
the codes, the categories, the themes and the topic of inquiry I developed the following 
concept map, using free software from the Institute for Human & Machine Cognition 
(https://cmap.ihmc.us/ mechanisms; Appendix B).  
The concept map depicted the relationship between the code, the categories, and 
the theme. Out of the interview data, 49 codes with 487 times of frequencies generated. 
Out of the 49 codes, 9 categories were generated, that was result in four themes. The 
values of the codes and the categories are discussed under each sub research question 
theme in the result section. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
As discussed in chapter 3 trustworthiness is everything about the research because 
it is about the soundness of the qualitative study (Creswell, 2013; Jacob, 2012, Rudestam 
and Newton, 2015; Saldaña, 2013). For the research result to be trustworthy, which 
means to be acceptable in the eyes of the reviewers and any reader, I kept the procedures 
I set in chapter 3.    
One of the elements of trustworthiness is credibility. Credibility relates the quality 
of the data, in the collection process, in the transcription process, and the analyses 
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process. As I mentioned earlier, I had a fear about the emotionality of some of the 
participants. As many people are engulfed in the current political situation and expressing 
their unhappiness and anger about the previous leadership, I was ready to tackle this issue 
by taking more time and creating a calmer situation, but to my surprise, all of the 
participants were mature enough to be fair and objective.   
I recorded the data; I transcribed it word by word leaving outside talks, jokes and 
some adverse information that could affect others. Though, I gave participants to check 
the transcript only two of the participants did check. In many instances, the participants 
referred to different legislation related to the issue for triangulation.  
For the result to be transferable, I carefully integrated the process of data 
collection, data analysis and result presentations in a concept map and tables. I cross 
checked that the findings are the result of the data. I did not notice any discrepancy from 
what I was designed in chapter 3 regarding the evidence of trustworthiness. 
Results of the Study 
The purpose of the study was to answer the central research question, which 
focused on searching for types of strategies ensuring an effective political control for 
preventing a possible abuse of power in the process of rulemaking and their 
implementation in Ethiopia. In order to address the quest in the central research question, 
I have added three elaborative sub-questions. The sub-questions were formulated in a 
way they could help to learn about the perceptions of elected and appointed federal 
officials. I was looking for their perceptions on the concept of delegating rulemaking 
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powers, on political control and accountability, and the ex-ante/ ex-post political control 
mechanisms in the rulemaking process.  
To address the inquiry I collected data mainly through interview questions, which 
is supported by legislative documents. Four themes were generated from the data. These 
themes have as specific meaning to this study. Delegating legislative power does not 
include any form of delegation except authorizing the administrative authorities to 
formulate rules and regulation to further a policy, which is approved by the legislative 
bodies. Delegation doctrine means any policy, precondition, or mechanism set before 
delegating the power to make rules to be applied either before the delegation or after the 
delegation. Political control benefits imply the benefits that the governance system or the 
public would benefit from controlling the behaviors of the administrative authorities, 
about their compliance. 
 Finally, political control mechanisms mean all forms of mechanisms the 
lawmakers could use to oversight the administrative organs about the power to exercise 
their delegation. In this section of each theme will be discussed under subsections 
research question they related to. I first present the aggregate results in the data coding 
and analysis framework found in Table 2. I will then discuss each theme and presented 
the data from the lawmakers and appointed officials perspective. 
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 Table 2  
Data Coding and Analysis Framework 
Theme Category Code Code frequency (f)   
Delegating 
legislative power  
 
 Effectiveness  
 
 
Technical capability    24   
Area expertise   8 
Organizational readiness     9 
Time  21 
Service delivery   13 
Decisiveness  Flexibility    17 
Adaptability   4 
Discretion  11 
Applicability of 
Policies  
Detailed rules  27 
Informed rules  6 
Contextualized rules  10 
Delegation 
doctrine  
Broad 
delegation 
Free of condition  7   
Time insensitive  3 
No oversight 6 
week oversight  4 
Free of restriction  11 
All rule  7 
Narrow 
delegation  
Conditional  8 
Time-oriented  4 
Specific Rules   2 
Strict oversight mechanisms  
3 
 
Political control 
benefits  
Accountability  Limited power 18   
 Serving public interest 33 
Self-interest 9 
Political/ Legal liability 7 
    Table continue           
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Theme Category Code Frequency (F)   
      
Rule of law   Lawfulness 11  
Compliance  21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political control 
mechanisms    
Ex-ante control 
mechanism  
 Public consultation  18  
 
 
 
 Web-based public notes and 
comments  
 15 
 
Institutional control   22 
Legal and procedural control  29 
 Parliamentarian‘s  Capacity and 
courage  
16 
 
 
 
Ex post control 
mechanisms  
 
Reporting  8 
Auditing 10 
Parliamentary review  11 
Cabinet review  10 
Judicial review  5 
Political and legal Penalty  11 
 
Table 2 explained two things. On the one hand, the table presented lists of the 
codes and their frequencies in the dataset. It presented the nine categories and the four 
themes. However, the table did not only present the codes, categories, and the themes but 
it also showed the interconnection between the codes, categories, and themes. 
On the left side of the table, there are themes. For example, the first theme is 
delegating legislative power, which is about the importance of legislative delegation. 
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Next, to the themes, there is a section where the categories sub-themes listed. 
Under the first theme, there are three categories where the theme emanated from. To the 
right of the categories, there is a section where the codes are listed. Under each category, 
there are lists of codes where the category was emanated from. The section to the right of 
the categories is about the frequency of each code, which implied that numbers of 
appearances of the code throughout data set. 
Thematic Presentation 
In this study, the central question focused on types of strategies ensuring an 
effective political control for preventing a possible abuse of power and noncompliance in 
the process of rulemaking in Ethiopia. However, the elements of central question are 
dissected into three elaborative sub-questions, which mean answering the sub-questions 
means addressing the central question. The four themes that emanated from the data set 
address the central and the sub research questions. Therefore, I will discuss the theme, in 
the lights of the research questions. 
Delegating legislative power.  
Theme one is about the necessity of delegating rulemaking power. The necessity 
of delegation is implied in sub research question one. The first sub research question is: 
what perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on delegating rulemaking 
powers? In this question, there are two parts. On the one hand, the question is about the 
perception of the elected and appointed official on the importance of delegating 
legislative power, and on the other hand, it is about their perception on the extent of the 
delegation. Theme one addressed the first part of the sub research question one. 
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Before asking about the strategies that could ensure controlling the behavior of 
administrative authorities, it might be better to ask about their perception regarding the 
importance of delegating the rulemaking power. Thus, the perception of the participants 
in this regard is presented in theme one as displayed in table 3. Regarding the issue 
related to the importance delegation, 9 codes generated and appeared a total of 148 times 
and categorized into three. The codes are mainly from interview question number 2, 3, 
and 4. Sometimes participants explained the importance of delegating the legislative 
power while speaking on the different issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3  
Theme 1 Data Presentation: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials 
have on (the importance of) delegating rulemaking powers? 
Theme1 Category Code Frequencies The 
frequency 
of 
Codes(F) 
 
Delegating 
legislative 
power  
 
Effectiveness  
 
 
Technical Capability   24   
Area expertise   8   
Organizational readiness   9   
Time  21   
Service delivery  13   
Decisiveness  Flexibility  17   
Adaptability  
4   
Discretion  10   
     
Applicability 
of Policies  
Detailed rules  27   
Informed rules  6   
Contextualized rules  9   
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As displayed in table 3, the theme is delegating legislative power. The research 
question is: what is your perception about legislative delegation? Participants answered 
the question in a way it generated three categories, which are effectiveness, decisiveness, 
and applicability of policies. The three categories implied that why is delegating 
legislative power essential or necessary. 
The effectiveness of the governance system is one of the elements that the 
participants explained as a reason for the importance of legislative delegation. One of the 
participants PP4 (parliamentarian participant) said that ―In the earlier times parliament 
had to enact every law because the business of the government was so limited. However, 
the modern-day complexity of administration forced parliaments to set general policies 
and to delegate the details.‖ For PP4 without delegating for the furtherance of policies, 
the government could not be as effective as the modern day administration so demands.  
Similarly, PP2 examined the necessity of delegation in the following manner. 
―After all, the government is there to deliver the necessary services. Thus if delegation is 
important for better service delivery, we have to delegate. The issue is not about power; it 
is about serving the public interest.‖ 
 One of the reasons for delegating for sake effectiveness is technical capability (f 
= 24). The phrase technical capability as a code appeared 24 times. Most of the 
participants raised the issue of the need for technical capability in modern administration. 
In this regard, EP1 (Official Executive participant) said ―Detailed rules can only be 
passed by the executive organ that has the technical capability,‖ he added that‖ as some 
areas of policies are highly technical‖ how we could expect the lawmakers to make such 
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technical rules? EP5 also asked, ―How can we ask the parliament to make rules on 
chemical and drug regulations?‖ 
The lack of ―area expertise,‖ one of the reasons the participants mentioned for 
delegating the rulemaking power for the government to be effective. PP5, said, ―We are 
politicians who care about policy issues, there might be few individuals who are experts 
in some areas but not in all issues, so the technical rules must be a concern of the capable 
bodies in the administration.‖ In the administration, there are many areas and industries 
begging for regulation. Thus, politicians in the parliament could not know issues in all 
public policy areas. PP1 examined the issues by saying‖ How could we know for 
example, what kind of fertilizer a farmer in a certain village needs?‖ EP2 elaborated this 
issue by saying, ―There might be few professionals in the different field, most of them as 
representative of the peasants and nomads, and they could not have the necessary 
expertise in all areas.‖ Every administrative agency has its areas of specialization, but the 
lawmakers are lawmakers for all public policy and regulatory issues. Both the reasoning 
and the justification are sensible.  
Another reason for supporting delegation for effectiveness is organization 
readiness and service delivery (f =17). The phrase organization readiness and service 
delivery together appeared 17 times in the transcript. For EP4, the fact that the 
constitution granted administrative bodies to make rules made them build capacity to 
make rules. PP2 shared the idea by saying ―Let alone to make all rules, we do not have 
the capacity even to enact broad legislation. Thus it is better to delegate to the cabinet and 
to administrative agencies, which are in better organizational readiness‖. Therefore, for 
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the participants, for the effectiveness of the governance system in delivering service to 
the public in better quality and in due time, delegating to those who have a better 
organizational position is beneficial.  
One of the codes that have the highest frequencies in the interviews the code 
Time(f = 21). For any institution to be competent, it needs to have the necessary time. 
The parliament as a forum of public policy and debate does not have enough time to 
make all rules. The participants mentioned time as a factor in the ineffectiveness of the 
parliament, had it not delegate to different administrative organs. EP1 said, ―The 
lawmakers have limits one of which is time." 
Similarly, EP3 said, ―It would be difficult for the parliament to formulate all laws 
within a given time frame, even if they work day and night.‖ PP4 also supported the issue 
of time limit as a reason for delegating by saying‖ My argument is parliament could not 
do everything, with its limited time.‖ According to the participants, if the parliament 
could not outsource the rulemaking power; the governance system would be ineffective 
because of time limitation due to conflicting priorities.  
Decisiveness is an ability of the government to deliver services, without 
unnecessary interferences. PP2 argued that if we do not trust the government and gave it 
some discretionary powers, it could not give the excepted services. Rules are the essential 
tools among others that enable the administrative organs to implement public policies 
(PP4).   
Flexibility (f =17) is one of the issues in implementing public policies. The 
participants used flexibility regarding delegation and excessive control. EP4 said, ―From 
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the executive organs perspective; it would be easy for them to make flexible and timely 
regulations so that they will be easily changed when the situation so demands.‖ The 
reason is it would be difficult for the lawmakers to make rules and to amend them within 
a short time.  
Additional reasons for the participants to support delegating rulemakings are 
adaptability and discretion (f =14).On the one hand, the rules must be adaptable to 
emerging changes and technologies. On the other hand, the administrative agencies 
should have some discretionary power to cope with changes by changing rules. PP3 and 
PP5 had to say‖ administrators can cope with the dynamism of circumstance so 
accommodate the change, the lawmakers must pass broad laws and let the executive body 
formulate detailed rules.‖ 
Applicability of policies is one of the reasons for the participants to stand for 
delegating the rulemaking power. “After all we formulate rules, not for mere delectation 
but implementations,‖ said EP4. Broad public policies will remain unimplemented if they 
are not supported by rules that detail, informed, and contextualized. PP3, EP4, and PP5 
gave their reasoning in the following way. ―The furtherance of the broad legislation is 
only possible through subordinate laws. Only an administrative agency who has technical 
capabilities can only pass such detailed laws.‖ Thus delegating the legislative power is 
essential for the applicability of broad policies passed by the lawmakers.  
 The underlying issue in theme one is that for the question of why is delegating 
legislative powers significantly, the response was to have a productive and decisive 
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government that serves the interest of the people. It is essential to make broad public 
policies implementable.  
Delegation doctrine.  
Theme 2, which is ―delegation doctrine, ”is a theme which is generated from the 
data on the question of what extent of delegation. The question about the extent 
delegation was implied in the first sub-question as discussed in theme one. The extent of 
delegation discusses whether a delegation is broad or narrow. The broadness of 
delegation implied much empowerment, broad discretion, and less control and 
restrictions. On the other hand, narrow legislation implies any restrictions and control. 
Table 4 
Theme2 Presentation of Data: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on 
(the extent of) delegating rulemaking powers?  
Theme 2 Categories  code Frequencies(f)  
     
Delegation 
doctrine  
Broad 
delegation-    
Free of condition  
7 
 
Time insensitive  4 
No oversight  6 
week oversight  4 
Free of restriction  11 
All rule  7 
Narrow 
delegation  
Conditional  7 
Time-oriented 4 
 Specific Rules  
2            
strict oversight mechanisms  
 
 
3 
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Broad delegation is one of the features of delegation doctrine. Different factors 
can measure the broadness of delegation. However, the participants mentioned six factors 
for measuring the broadness of delegation. These are delegation, which is free of 
conditions (f = 7), time insensitive (f = 4), the absence of oversight as a policy (f = 6), 
weak oversight as a policy (f = 4), delegation with free of restriction(f = 11) and 
delegating without a limit scope (all rules; f = 7). Some participants said the value or the 
public interest that could be created by delegation must determine the broadness or 
narrowness of delegation. If the interest of the public is going to be served well by 
making the delegation broad, it must be broad. 
EP5, EP1, and PP5 argued that if a broad delegation policy is going to affect the 
public interest, we have to make it narrow. In addition to the public interest, the 
participants mentioned controllability of the delegated power as a factor to determine the 
extent of the delegation, which means the lawmakers should not delegate a power that 
they could not control. On the other hand, EP2 argued that the broadness and narrowness 
of the delegation must be measured from the nature of the policy. For him, delegations 
related to policies such as human rights and crimes must be narrow.  
Though the participants have a different stand on what should be better for 
Ethiopia; all agreed that the Ethiopian practices of the delegation are broad delegation. 
According to EP1, EP2, EP4, and PP5, most of our legislation stipulated in the last pages, 
clauses such as‖ the council of misters may enact regulation to implement the 
proclamation‖ or the ministry may enact directives to implement this proclamation or the 
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regulation to be enacted by the council of ministers per this proclamation‖. The evidence 
is tranquilized and sample legislation attached (Appendix C). 
Narrow delegation is the second feature of the delegation doctrine. The 
participants mentioned setting conditions, putting time lime, limiting the scope regarding 
areas, and setting strict oversight mechanism are factors to measure the narrowness of 
rules.  Five of the PPs mentioned a rule of three months as a limit. They mentioned 
House‘s rules of procedures and members code of conduct regulation number 6 /2016. I 
checked regulation article 60 (6)and said delegated regulations and directives must be 
enacted within 3 months since the day of enforcement of the mother delegation.  
In summary, the participants think that the practice of Ethiopia‘s delegating 
legislative power is broad. However, some of the participants think that delegation should 
be narrow and restricted. Others argued that what matters is not the narrowness or 
broadness, but the benefits that the public could get from the delegation and the 
controllability of the delegation. One participant thinks that the narrowness or broadness 
of the delegation must be based on the nature and sensitivity of the policy. 
Political control benefits.  
The theme of political control benefits was generated from the data collected in 
response to the second subquestion. The second sub-question was about the perceptions 
the elected and appointed officials have on the issue of political control and 
accountability as an essential component of the central research question. The concepts of 
control and oversight did not seem favorable words. One of the participants EP3 was 
unhappy to hear the word control he said, ―I hate the word control.‖ Moreover, the 
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participants see the importance of control from the perspective of accountability and the 
rule of law.  
 
Table 5.  
Theme 3 Data Presentation: What perceptions do the elected and appointed officials have on 
the issue of political control and accountability? 
Theme Category Code Frequency   
     
Political Control  
Benefits    
Accountability  Limited power   18  
Serving public interest 33 
Self-interest   9 
Political/ Legal liability   7 
Rule of Law   Lawfulness   11 
Compliance   21 
 
Accountability is one of the reasons for the participants to opt for political control. 
EP4 said, ―Uncontrolled power is corruptible, so if we are unable to hold accountable 
those who cross the lines, it is meaningless. ‖Similarly, PP5 said ‗if the parliament is 
unable to control the power, it delegates it must not delegate.‖ The following terms are 
generated as-aspects of accountability in the political control. These are a limited power (f 
= 18), serving the public interest (f = 33), serving self-interest (f = 9) and political and 
legal liabilities (f = 7) in case of violation.  
 Limiting the power seems the only way to accuse the agencies of trespass. In this 
regard, EP1 had to say ―if we create a government, which is not limited and accountable, 
we will destroy the young democratic institution we have already created.‖ for EP1 
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uncontrolled or unlimited power is an existential threat to our democracy. PP4 and EP4 
also said, ―The unimplemented legislations are the typical examples of unlimited and 
uncontrolled power.‖ 
The two antagonistic terms generated from the data about accountability are 
serving the public interest, which appeared 33 times as the highest frequented code and 
serving self-interest, which appeared nine times. The participant argued that political 
control could force the administrative organs to serve the public interest. Otherwise, they 
will serve their self-interest. In this regard, EP4 said, ―If we do not have mechanisms to 
control the exercise of that power, so citizens are under the mercy of the powerful.‖  
PP1 said, ―Power is a precious thing, it is also dangerous, so we have to make 
sure that parliament is controlling the power for the sake of the public interest.‖ PP3 in 
his opinion also said, ―control is important, after all, power is to serve the people, so we 
have to control it. Otherwise, it can be used against the interest of the people.‖ The 
essence of the message is that if power is not serving the people, it must be serving self-
interest. 
For the question of why political control was needed, the answers of the 
participants included that it was needed for the sake of lawfulness and compliance. The 
rule of law means limiting some persons‘ power and making them accountable. If they 
fail to live within the formwork of the law irrespective of the effects on their feelings, it is 
a failure. PP4 also said, ―The rule of law must be respected; we have to make sure that 
the government is working within the framework of the law.‖ 
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The participants addressed the second sub research question by emphasizing on 
two categories of the benefits of political control that are the rule of law and compliance. 
Compliance, which is working within the framework of the given law, is as substantial as 
working according to the law (EP4). 
Political control mechanisms.  
The fourth theme political control mechanism emanated from the data collected in 
response to research question 3, which is the fundamental essence of the central quest. 
The central research question is what strategies would ensure an effective political 
control for preventing a possible abuse of power and noncompliance in the process of 
rulemaking in Ethiopia.  So the inquiry was about the strategies that could manage or 
control the possible misbehaviors of administrative organs in the exercising of their 
rulemaking power  
The identified fourth theme is a political control mechanism. Its features are two 
categories. These are ex- ante control mechanism and ex-post control mechanism. This 
theme is based mostly on participants‘ personal experiences than theoretical knowledge. 
The participants also address the question in the lights of the legislation I picked a case in 
the study. Participants mentioned other similar legislation and experiences when the 
address this research question. The theme covers a control mechanism from legislative or 
regulation initiation to post-promulgation review mechanism. 
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Table 6  
Theme 4 Data Presentation: What are the ex-ante/ ex-post political control mechanisms in the 
rulemaking process? 
 
Theme Category Code Frequency(f)  
    
 Ex-ante   Public consultation   18  
 
 
 
 
Political 
control  
control 
mechanism  
Web-based public notes and comments   15 
 
 
 
Institutional control 22 
 
 
Legal and procedural control  29 
 Parliamentarian‘s Capacity and courage  
16 
mechanisms  
 
 
Ex post 
control 
mechanisms  
 
Reporting  8 
Auditing  10 
Parliamentary review  11 
Cabinet review  10 
Judicial review  5 
Political and legal Penalty  11 
 
The participants also have in mind two types of subordinate legislation. These are 
regulations – formulate by the council of misters and directives formulated by each 
ministry or agencies. The ministries or administrative agencies might get the delegation 
directly from the lawmaker through the legislation or from the council of ministers 
through regulations. I attached sample delegation clauses form legations and regulation 
(Appendix D).  
Ex- ante control mechanisms are one of the features of the political control 
mechanism. Ex –ante control mechanisms cover all political control mechanism from the 
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initiation of the legislation or regulation to its approval by the authoritative body. From 
the interview data public consultation the following five pre –legislations coding 
mechanisms were generated.    
Quality and compliance control can start at the early age of the draft legislation. 
Web-based public notes and comments and public consultation are two of the frequently 
mentioned methods of pre-legislation. EP4 said public consultation (f = 18) means 
inviting those affected by the policy for discussion. On the other hand, giving the public 
an opportunity to comment on a new proposal can enrich the legislation or regulation for 
free and creates a sense of ownership. EP5 and PP5 cited an article from the internal 
cabinet directive, which says ―any preparing legislation at any level shall be kept secret 
unless the council of ministers decided otherwise.‖ Having in mind the fact that, laws in 
Ethiopia submitted to council only for approval, keeping theme secret seems unbelievable 
because of laws are initiated by each ministry or agency. 
Both PP1 and PP3 mentioned the importance of web-based technologies not only 
for quality and control but also for accessibility of legislation and regulation. EP1 and 
EP4 concluded that public comment is absent and public consultation is highly limited 
and not considered because of lack of control.   
 Institutional and legal pre-legislation control mechanisms are another two of the 
pre-legislative control mechanisms. No institution could control the quality of any 
legislation or regulation unless it is empowered or established by the law. Almost all 
participants notably, EP 1, EP5, PP3, and PP4 agreed on the importance of institutional 
and legal instruments for controlling the rulemaking process.  However, all participants 
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witnessed that no legal and institutional instrument able the parliament to control the 
rulemaking process which is ex-ante control. The only instance where the control 
mechanism is cited is the 3 months‘ time limit stipulated in the internal working 
procedures of the parliament. The in internal working producers is exclusive to the 
parliament. The 3 month time is not stipulated in every legislation; hence there is no legal 
framework for the parliament to enforce it. The same is true for the parliament not to be 
able to hold the administrative organs accountable for not observing the three-month 
limit. The 3 month rule is only applicable to members of the house. 
Ex- post control mechanisms are methods of control of the abuse and non- 
compliance of legislation by the delegated administrative organs. The following post- 
legislation control mechanisms were generated from the interview data. These are 
mandatory reporting, auditing, cabinet review judicial review, and political and legal 
penalty. These are important and directly related to the case I picked. However, Cabinet 
review and judiciary review mechanisms are treated as discrepant cases and factored into 
the study as cases show the limitation of the study.  
Legislative auditing, according to PP5 is ―a process of checking the 
implementation of legislation, the compliance regulations and directives with the 
legislation‖ In some case, there are laws enacted years ago but not implemented yet. For 
example, EP4 mentioned commercial code which passed in1960 (still enforce). 
According to the commercial code, there are many agencies to be established by which 
part of the laws implementable. He added that in 2000 a family code passed by the 
parliament, the parliament delegated council of ministers to enact regulation to establish a 
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legislation agency within six months. The agency is not established to date. I checked this 
and found the fowling article 32(1), ―The federal government shall, within six months 
from the coming into force of this code, issue registration law applicable to the 
administrations where this code is to be enforced and establish the necessary 
institutions.‖The claimed institution is non-existent to date. 
One of the most critical post legislations control mechanism is penalizing those 
who transgress. The penalty can be political and legal. For example, the cabinet did not 
enact regulation to establish a registration intuition, but no one has been held 
accountable, even after 18 years. The national identity card in the vital events and 
national identity card proclamation event must be operationalized in 2014. The agency 
which was supposed to carry out the program has never been established. Therefore, the 
program has become an impossibility. No institution or government body was held 
accountable for negligence and noncompliance. The establishment and program have 
never taken a step of realization apart from being written on paper. 
 All participants said the failure and the nonoperationalization of the critical 
national program, which a national identity card program is a typical breakdown of the 
control system. EP4 said this case implied that ―our legal system is in bad shape. EP5 
also said that‖ It seems as if the Ethiopian government is enacting some of the laws to 
fulfill some international standard without its will.‖ PP4 and PP5 said that because the 
program is somehow related to national security, no one dares to ask about its status.‖ 
PP3 and PP2 mentioned the failure even to know about the existence of the critical 
national program as ―the most disappointing case.‖ 
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 For all the mechanisms, post legislation control, mainly accountability is none 
existent the Ethiopian legislative process and post-legislation situation. No participant 
could mention any instance, where an official or a government body was held 
accountable for his or its failure to act.  
Two of the participants PP4 and EP3 argued that the one who has real political 
power is the executive. They argue that the head of the ruling party is the prime minister. 
As the ruling party is the sources of political ideology, the parliament could not be the 
highest political body. The power of the parliament is merely a formality; in essence, the 
real power is at the hand of the executive branch.  
As mentioned earlier, the center of this study is political control over the behavior 
of the administrative authorities. As I reviewed in the literature, there are additional 
review mechanisms such as judicial review. Participants EP4 and EP5 mentioned judicial 
review as a limited additional mechanism in individual cases. However, the parliament as 
principal at least in a constitutional framework has the highest role. For example, almost 
all ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms must be set by the parliaments. 
 However, there is no capacity (readiness) and courage in the parliamentarians‘ 
side. PP5 who won the seat for three terms and served as standing committee chair said: 
―the real power and the principal is the executive, not the parliament.‖ He added that 
when legislation comes from the cabinet for approval and some of the members of the 
parliament raised questions, a lawyer form the cabinet or the attorney general come and 
say, ― this is a government policy, or if the chair of standing committee or the house 
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speaker said, it is a policy issue, no one would argue again. Because we believe the 
policy maker is the executive.‖  
PP5 added that ―we do not dare to control the officials or their institution because 
sometimes they could be our bosses in the party platform. We need to be re-selected by 
the party for the next election, so we have to be careful.‖ He added that ―when you 
become tough in some cases, the ministers asked, ‗are not you from our party?‖ PP5 
hoped that the new prime minister would change some aspects of the problem. 
In this regard, PP2 added that ―We might be more concerned in the case of our 
constituent‘s specific problems. However, generally, the executive is more concerned 
about the people than us‖, PP1 said ―What must be clear is that the executive officials are 
more close to the people, which means they are concerned. After all, we form the same 
party‖. For PP5 the problem is related to the fact that all the parliamentarians are from the 
same party. Party discipline is more binding than the power in the parliament. Therefore, 
in the Ethiopian situation, the parliamentarians are more concerned about the party 
discipline than the law and their constituents.   
 For EP3 the idea of political control of the lawmakers is insignificant because the 
real power is in the hand of the executive. He believed that even the parliamentarians are 
not equal to the executive branch. PP4 asked me to look at the differences between the 
office of the prime minister and the house speaker. The office of any standing committee 
chair and any minister‖ he said, ―The parliament is there only for formality.‖ 
For PP4 there is no instance where the members of the parliament resisted 
legislation and remained unapproved. He said,‖ if you continue resisting they take the 
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issue into a party platform then you will be warned.‖ EP4said, ―We have a system where 
the parliament is a supreme body that can control the activists of the administration and it 
can also remove the prime ministers, but this is merely a framework.‖ For him, the 
practice is the parliament is subordinate to the executive. 
When I asked about the fate of the national identity card proclamation in light of 
the control mechanism, almost all participants believed that the success of the program 
depends on the interest of the government. EP1 and EP2 are sure that in practice the 
parliament could not force the government or any agency to carry out the program. EP4 
added that unless it is the interest of the head of the government, political control is not a 
solution. EP5 and PP4 believed that ―The fate of the legislation and the intended program 
will have the same fate with the similar forgotten legislations.‖ 
 Why does the parliament have lost the courage to address misbehavior legally? 
PP4 and PP5 believed that ―The source of the problem is a dependency.‖ For them ―The 
parliament as an institution is dependent on the executive for budgetary issues and all 
facilities.‖ The same is true for each member as individuals because they are dependent 
on the executive bosses. According to PP4 and PP5 ―The members are dependent for 
reelection, for no one will compete in his name and for some promotion within the 
parliament, which is impossible without party blessing.‖  
 PP5 hoped that ―The new prime minister promised that he would make standing 
committee chair and a minister equal in statues and benefits, so the issue will be 
changed‖ I heard about the promise in the media. However, the idea that the executive 
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head will change the statutes of the legislative officials affirms that the parliament is still 
somehow dependent.  
Summary 
For the central question what strategies would ensure an effective political control 
for preventing a possible abuse of power and non- compliance in the process of 
rulemaking in Ethiopia, the participants gave the following answers and 
recommendations. Setting an open and participatory legislative system is the first 
suggestion. Establishing an intuitional mechanism, which can serve as pre-legislation 
clearinghouses, is another one. Building the capacity and the courage of the parliament so 
that they will be able to audit, to hear reports and to review the implantations of delegated 
power are among the mechanisms that the participants suggested. Establishing a legal 
system that sets the standard for the quality and compliance of rules and regulations is 
mentioned as a priority. Above all, establishing a system where officials can be held 
accountable for non- observance, of rules is essential.  
For all participants, delegation is essential because it helps create an effective and 
decisive government. It is helpful for the applicability of public policies. As to its extent, 
public benefit (necessity), controllability and nature of the public policy are the factors 
that must determine the extent. The control according to the participants is the delegated 
power helping the enhancement of the rule of law and compliance. 
In this chapter, I reported the process of data collection and data analysis. I 
reassured data trustworthiness and the measures I took. Finally, I presented the data. In 
the next chapter,I will discuss my take on the findings and forward my recommendation. 
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Chapter 5: Interpretations, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of the research was to explore and understand the control 
mechanisms for the administrative power of deriving rules from set laws in Ethiopia. In 
principle, lawmaking is the power of the lawmakers. However, because of practical 
reasons such as time limitation, level of expertise, and closeness to the subject matter, the 
lawmakers delegate the power of deriving rules to execute the set laws to the 
administrative organs for the furtherance of the policies. Unless there is a mechanism to 
set a limit to the delegated power and control the process of making rules by the owner of 
the power that is entrusted by the public, the delegated power could concentrate in the 
hands of the executive. A concentration of power, in turn, could adversely affect the 
essence of democracy by creating a vulnerability that could misguide the original intent 
of the law. To understand the Ethiopian situation in this aspect, I collected interview data 
from relevant elected and appointed officials. I analyzed some legislation to supplement 
the evidence that was generated from the interview data. 
The critical findings generated from the interview data include four themes and 
nine categories that are indicated in Table 2. The perception of lawmakers and executive 
official regarding legislative delegation and the control mechanisms in Ethiopia were 
generated from the interview data. The first theme is about the importance of delegating 
legislative power. According to the participants, delegating legislative power is vital for 
effective service delivery, for creating a vibrant governance system, and for applying 
broad public policies. As to the extent of the delegation, the findings showed broad and 
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narrow delegation as alternatives. According to the participants, the factors for broadness 
or narrowness must be based on the necessity of the delegation for public benefit. 
Accordingly, if a broad delegation is going to benefit the public, no doctrine should 
restrict it. If the delegation is going to affect the public interest, no doctrine should be a 
reason for broadening the extent of delegation.  
Another vital measuring tool suggested by the participants was controllability. 
Controllability implies the ability of the legislators to control the application and the 
process of the rulemaking power. This concept of controllability indicates that it is better 
for the lawmakers not to delegate their power of rulemaking if they cannot control its 
application and process.  
Participants believed that the nature and sensitivity of the public policy must 
determine the narrowness and broadness of the delegation. Sensitivity includes human 
rights issues, national security, and financial issues for which the nature of the policy 
requires equal if not higher vigilance than technical expertise. In these cases, managing 
the risk becomes a priority. 
The fundamental essence of the research was to explore the political control 
situation, to understand the existence of control strategies and analyze existing strategies. 
The perception of the elected and appointed officials, in this case, was that the essential 
nature of political control to ensure the rule of law and compliance must be consistent 
and agreed on. However, when it comes to the kind of rulemaking process controlling 
mechanism, the findings reveal that there is no precise legal, institutional, or 
technological mechanism. The fact that there is no instance when lawmakers have held 
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administrative officials accountable for their abuse of power proves that either there is no 
political control mechanism or no ability or will to employ such a mechanism. 
However, participants recommended institutional control, mandatory public 
consultation, and mandatory legal procedural mechanism that require the council of 
ministers and administrative organs to report to lawmakers. The possibility of legislative 
review at least on compulsory regulations was suggested. Participants recommended 
regular regulatory auditing to ensure the integrity of the process.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
The interview data generated results are in most cases are consistent with the 
literature as reviewed in Chapter 2. The emerging findings imply that the perception of 
the lawmakers and executive officials is also consistent with the reviewed literature. 
However, there are unique instances of inconsistency requiring further study. I discuss 
these unique instances uncovered in the literature review later in this chapter. 
The importance of ―delegating legislative power‖ appeared as a significant 
finding, confirmed by all participants with no reservation. The reasons behind the 
delegation of legislative power are effectiveness, decisiveness, and applicability of broad 
policies. These three subthemes resulted in theme ―delegating legislative power.‖ 
When the participants mentioned effectiveness as a reason for delegating the 
rulemaking power, they implied that administrative authorities are in a better position 
than lawmakers for rulemaking because they possess the better technical capability, the 
better expertise of the policy areas, better time allocation, better organizational readiness, 
and superior capacity to deliver public services. Thus, the finding is consistent with the 
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reviewed literature (Clark & Leiter; 2011; Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; 
Walker, 2015). 
The basic idea behind effectiveness through delegation is that the existence of a 
government is to serve the public effectively and efficiently. In the absence of 
effectiveness, the need for a government becomes questionable. The public entrusts the 
lawmakers to create laws that would benefit the public. By delegating their power to able 
bodies, lawmakers serve the public more appropriately and responsibly. 
The second reason for the participants to believe that delegating legislative power 
is essential is decisiveness. According to the participants, administrative bodies are in a 
better position to give timely decisions than the lawmakers. The participants believed that 
administrative bodies have flexibility and better organizational and legal settings to 
render timely and informed decisions than the lawmaker. In the current public 
administration, citizens demand flexible but appropriate services, which will be difficult 
for the lawmaker to deliver given their position and level of subject matter expertise. 
Administrative bodies are more adaptive to changes than the lawmakers because they are 
agencies specialized for a specific public policy issue, established to deliver services 
directly related to the policy. 
Applicability of policies was the third subtheme for the participants to support 
delegating rulemaking power. Public administration and public service delivery demand 
constant change fitting the situation. The government needs to have a way to cope with 
the change by enacting contextualized and detailed rules to be able to respond to demands 
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in due time (Daniels, 2014; Walker, 2015). The finding, in this case, is consistent with the 
literature.  
The second finding is the ―delegation doctrine.‖ The legislative delegation can be 
extended in two ways labeled as narrow delegation and board delegation. None of the 
participants held a stand against the legislative delegation but had differing opinions on 
the extent to which delegation can be applied. The difference was on how much and what 
kind of delegation must the lawmakers confer on the administrative bodies. This is 
directly consistent with the reviewed literature as written by Elias, (2016), Iuliano, 
(2018), Kelley, (2017), Manning(2015), and Pecaric (2015), who stated that the 
delegation/nondelegation controversy shifted towards agreeing on the need for delegation 
but still arguing on the extent of its application.  
While narrow delegation versus broad delegation became the central idea, 
participants‘ concerns were not its application per se but matching the type of delegation 
to the appropriate situation. The extent of the delegation should be situational depending 
on the sensitivity of the policy. For example, if the policy is on the area such as human 
rights, it must be narrow and restricted. 
Second, participants also indicated that public interest must be considered in the 
process of delegating. The evidence of public benefit must determine the broadness or 
narrowness of delegation. Public interest, in this case, could be related to rulemaking to 
execute a critical solution addressing issues of public concern such as national security. 
The other issue that participants raised is the extent of delegation about the nature 
of the policy. If a policy is more technical, broad delegation is advisable. While narrow 
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delegation becomes sufficient in case of policies with minimal technicality. Hence 
controllability must be the criteria to determine the extent of the legislative delegation. 
Lawmakers should match the extent of their delegation to how much control they could 
have on the process. Broadness or narrowness hence become criteria, but the application 
depends on the situation at hand. 
Political control benefits are the third finding related to the benefit of controlling 
the administrative organs‘ behavior when power is delegated to them. For the question of 
why the lawmakers should control the rulemaking process, the answer is to benefit the 
democratic system and the public at large through accountability and the rule of law. 
Accountability is implied in the data as taking legal and political responsibility for 
crossing the line when individuals choose to pursue their self-interest instead of that of 
the public. The rule of law, on the other hand, is implied by the data as working within 
the framework of the legal system and discharging duties within the limit of the law by 
complying with the structure of the legislation. The finding is consistent with reviewed 
literature that states agencies must be in line with the preferences of the principals and 
comply with the objectives they set (Daniels, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Nicolai & 
Stea, 2014). However, the practical experience reveals no instance of political control of 
the rulemaking process.    
The fourth finding, which is the most relevant to the central question, is a 
―political control mechanism.‖ Given the fact that political control is necessary, an active 
control mechanism is indispensable. The political control mechanism can even be applied 
at the initial stage of the process, before any type of approval. Given this opportunity, it is 
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essential to analyze how lawmakers control the legal application and create 
accountability in the case of noncompliance. 
The data generated the ex-ante control mechanisms and the ex-post control 
mechanisms. Ex- ante control mechanisms are mechanisms that can be applied before the 
approval of regulations by the council of ministers and the approval of directives through 
their respective public agencies. The ex-ante control mechanism, on the other hand, 
allows the parliament to review any noncompliance after the approval of the regulations 
and directives by the relevant bodies.  
The ex-ante control mechanisms that are generated from the data are public 
consultation, web-based public comments, institutional reviews, legal and procedural 
applications on the process, and parliamentarians‘ expert review. The idea is the 
parliament must set a mandatory public consultation procedure where the public‘s voice 
could be heard before the approval of the regulations and directives. The public 
consultation might be limited to those who are directly affected. However, the web-based 
public comment could be made available to all interested parties. This finding is 
consistent with the reviewed literature, particularly with ideas forwarded by Nicolai and 
Stea, (2014) and Walker (2015). However, both mechanisms discussed are nonexistent in 
the case of Ethiopia. 
Institutional control and legal and procedural control are other mechanisms 
inferred from the data as ex-ante control mechanisms. The idea of institutional control 
means, the parliament must establish or use established offices such as its secretariat or 
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the standing committees to review the regulations and directives. The mechanism is in 
line with the reviewed literature.  
However, there is no single committee or institution that the parliament uses to 
control the regulations and rulemaking process. The parliaments are only knowledgeable 
of the number of regulations passed by the cabinet because it is the secretariat of the 
house who assigns numbers to each publication of the regulations. There is no practice of 
publishing directives and creating awareness among parliamentarians. This leaves them 
uninformed regarding the content, number, type, and application of directives. 
Setting legal and procedural mechanism is another ex-ante mechanism generated 
from the data. All the ex-ante mechanisms discussed so far could not happen without the 
legal or procedural mechanism. This is consistent with the literature, but in practice, no 
law regulates the rule and directives-making process. The only mechanism is the 3 
months‘ time limit stipulated in the parliament‘s internal working procedures regulation, 
which is usually overlooked.  
Ex-post control mechanisms are one of the pillars of political control. Ex-post 
control mechanism means any mechanism that the parliament can use to review the 
regulations and directives after their approval by relevant authorities. One of the 
mechanisms can force the institution to report on the rules and regulation and their 
implementation to the parliament. The other mechanism is establishing regulatory and 
auditing system so that the parliament can make a planned or surprise audit to know how 
many rules and regulations are formulated and whether they are consistent with the 
mother law.   
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Another critical question is what would happen when some authorities 
intentionally or negligently violate rules, guidelines and other mechanisms already set by 
lawmakers? The answer is obviously to hold the trespasser liable either politically or 
legally. The political and legal penalty is the most crucial post-legislative mechanism. 
Without accountability, no one could assure that all involved would respect the 
delegation doctrine. In the literature, there are many mechanisms such as demanding 
reports from the agencies, monitoring the rulemaking activities by evaluating the 
performance of offices of committees based on public feedback. The ex-post control 
could include checking if the agencies are complying not only with statuary objectives 
but also by using the ex-ante control mechanisms.  
The ex-post control also enables the principals to penalize non- compliances of 
any sort (Balla, 2014; Kerwin & Furlong, 2011; Nau, 2013; Nicolai & Stea, 2014; 
Sant'Ambrogio, 2011). According to the findings, there are no known clear mechanisms 
and controlling practices, in the case of Ethiopia. 
Analysis and interpretation of the findings in the context of the theoretical 
framework. 
 I used the principal–agency model as a lens for this study. As discussed in the 
literature the principal–agency model is based on at least four underlying assumptions. In 
this section, I discuss participants‘ assumptions in light of the literature, which helps to 
identify the connection between the findings and the theory. I will summarize the 
assumptions regarding the results or the themes.  
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The first assumption is that there is a dichotomy between policies – and 
administrations (Frederickson et al., 2015). The assumption implies that policymakers 
and bureaucratic authorities have a dichotomous interest (Frederickson et al., 2015; 
Georgiou, 2014). According to the theory, agents tend to promote their institutional or 
self-interest at the cost of the principal's interest. The findings of the study showed that 
the participants had these assumptions in mind when they discussed the importance of 
legislative delegation and the delegation doctrine, and confirmed the existing dichotomy.  
The second confirmation is the relationship between the principals, and the agents 
(lawmakers and administrative agencies) is hierarchal. The principals are at a higher 
ladder in the relationship (Frederickson et al., 2015; Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011; Mitnick, 
1975a). It would have no meaning for the participants to recommend control 
mechanisms, which suggest consequences if participants would not assume that their 
relationship between the makers and administrative agencies is hierarchical. The 
assumptions implied that there is always a conflict of interest between the principals, who 
represent the public interest, and the bureaucratic agents who mostly represent their 
personal, institutional, and industrial interests (Kerwin, & Furlong, 2011). 
According to the theory the agents tend to promote institutional or self-intents and 
policy preferences at the expense of the principal's interest. The fact that one of the 
findings is the importance of political control implies that participants assume that there 
is a conflict of interest between the two. The interest of the principals must prevail over 
that of the agents. The finding of the importance of political control implies that the 
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participants assume they are at the higher position than the agent and do not anticipate to 
be controlled and corrected by their inferiors in position. 
The fourth assumption behind the theory is that the deviant behavior of the agents 
is manageable and controllable. So by setting different control mechanism, the 
policymakers can control or oversight the behavior of the administrators. The participants 
mentioned time and again the concept of controllability and the mechanism of control. 
The fact that the participants suggest control mechanism to manage the deviant behavior 
of the agents implies that they assumed that there is a dichotomy. 
The findings, which are the result of the perceptions and recommendations of all 
participants evidenced that the theoretical understanding and the practice in the ground 
are so different. The evidence from the data showed that the parliament as an institution 
and its members are dependent on the executive. The members of the parliament are 
dependent for reelection, promotion to different leadership ladders such as chairing a 
standing committee,  issues such as housing and other benefits are dependent on the 
mercy of the executive. 
In practice, the parliament could not reject any delegation or policy, which the 
cabinet approved. It is challenging for the parliament to resist the cabinet‘s decision 
because the executive owns the real power. Therefore, to reconcile the findings with the 
theoretical model is difficult. In Ethiopian legal and theoretical framework, the 
lawmakers are the principals. However, this is more of a formality than practice. In 
reality, the executive authorities are the principals because they are the real policymakers. 
In the literature, the agents could use much trickery tools to influence the policy. They 
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can use technical capabilities, information asymmetry, and interpretive power. However, 
according to the data, in Ethiopia, the executive officials did not need any trick because 
they have the final word on policy, and no lawmaker could resist. Thus, participants 
confuse legitimate public policy issues and party ideology since the executive branch is 
led by the prime minister who is also a party chairman in the party platform. 
 The fact that the lawmakers are hoping the new leadership will change their lives 
and increase their benefits implies their dependency. The new emerging code which 
recommended as a solution is the capacity and courage of the lawmakers. Thus, one of 
the mechanisms, which did not appear in the literature, is the need for the courage of the 
lawmakers to discharge constitutional powers. 
I made sure that the interpretation of the findings is within the scope of the data 
by not adding a new thing or expanding beyond the limit. The fact that there is no single 
authority held responsible for non-compliance while there are many cases of non-
compliance within the limited rules; and the fact that there are no practical mechanisms to 
control delegate power implies limited political capacity or lack of courage. The finding 
showed that though there is an understanding of the issue by the participants, there is a 
mechanism to exercise constitutional power. 
Limitation of the Study 
The limitation stated in chapter 1 remained the same throughout the execution of 
the study. However, during the study, I noted that the following limitation needs 
emphasis. Discussing the broad national idea in light of a legislation or policy might 
undermine the issue. The study was limited to 10 participants while the purpose is to 
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explore and increase the Ethiopian mechanism of controlling the use of rulemaking 
power. One of the many ways to address this limitation could be evaluating the effect of 
the unfettered exercise of delegated rulemaking power, by assessing a higher number of 
cases. 
Another limitation that I learned after the execution of the study is the challenge 
and difficulty to assess the Ethiopian situation based on the legal and theoretical 
frameworks. For unclear reasons, the participants mentioned that lack of courage to 
exercise power in the Ethiopian parliament is a contributing factor to the quality of the 
study. Participants have both the knowledge and the willingness but have no encouraging 
circumstances to deliver.  
The third limitation which was not considered in the design was that the study is 
limited to political control or oversight mechanisms of rules. However, there are other 
oversight mechanisms, such as judiciary reviews, cabinet reviews. The cabinet can 
review the directive making by the agencies and other administrative and political review 
mechanism, which were not addressed in this study. Therefore, to have a full picture of 
the Ethiopian legislative oversight issues, there needs to be further study addressing all 
mechanism.  
Recommendations 
Based on the literature reviewed and the findings from the data, I am convinced 
that there is a need for more understandings of the situation on the following three issues. 
For the country to be democratic, improving the rule of law and accountability of the 
administrative authorities is essential. In the finding, I have not come across anyone held 
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accountable for their inappropriate application of delegated rulemaking power. However, 
for the issue to be more understood, further research should be conducted on why are the 
parliamentarians lacking the courage to use their constitutional power? Why do they want 
to remain loyal to their party than the constitutional? What is the real thing that they fear? 
Dependency might be one issue, but I suspect it might be part of our culture, which 
evolved through time. In our long history, as discussed in chapter one, the sources of all 
laws were the kings, and later in the communist regime the party chairman. My 
understanding is that such a culture might influence the parliamentarians, but it needs 
further study.  
My second recommendation for further study is about the directives that are 
formulated by public agencies. Unlike the regulations enacted by the cabinet, the 
parliament does not have any legal, institutional or other platforms to control the legality 
and compliance of the directives. There is no system in place to find out how many of the 
directives contradict the mother legislation and the constitution and there is no record on 
how many directives are enacted so far. Therefore, I recommend further study on rules 
mainly directives that are enacted by every federal agency and the possible contradiction 
with the establishment of the constitutional and legislative system.   
The third recommendation is that the federal state design clears legislative 
delegation mechanisms. Since regional states are where most of the citizens reside, the 
design will give a full picture of the Ethiopian delegated legislative power and the control 
there off. I recommend similar studies at the regional level.  
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Implications 
Ethiopians have been pursuing a democratic system where there is the rule of law 
not the rules of men. At the moment of conducting this research, Ethiopia was passing 
through a web of changes. The prevalent concern of citizens, as shown in many writings 
and messages through the media, was about the rule of law, accountability of officials 
and the government as a whole. If power is not controlled, even favorable change can 
turn into a disaster. One of the areas where controlling is essential is rulemaking because 
uncontrolled rulemaking enables agencies to act irresponsibly in the name of the rules. 
One of the participants stated that the bureaucratic language in Ethiopia is ―according to 
directives, not according to the law.‖ This implied that agency directives are more 
respected than the legislation because agency directives remain to be principles of 
operation. 
 Controlling the rulemaking process and holding those who violate the rules 
responsibly is the way of enhancing and maintain our democracy because without limited 
and controlled power there is no democracy. Moreover, without democracy there no 
positive social change. So I firmly believe that the findings will help create understanding 
particularly in the lawmaking organ and the government as a whole. Thus, the study ‘s 
implication for positive social change is very high. Though the study was conducted at 
the federal level; its implications are mostly applicable to the regional states‘ rulemaking 
process.  
115 
  
Conclusion 
The purpose of the study was to explore the kind of strategies would ensure an 
effective political controlled rulemaking in Ethiopia and expose any abuse of rulemaking 
power. The findings showed that both officials support legislative delegation and the 
legislative doctrine. Their view is consistent with the reviewed literature in the study. The 
officials have a clear stand on the issue of political control. The findings showed that 
control is critical to guarantee the integrity of the rule of law and accountability of the 
administrative authorities in the rulemaking process.  
 The findings implied that the officials have a consistent knowledge about the ex- 
ante, and ex- post control mechanism. However, in practice, there is no practice of any of 
these control mechanisms in place. It is paradoxes that while all participants are 
enthusiastic about the importance of control and setting control mechanism. There is no 
single controlling mechanism in place (except the unpracticed 3 months‘ time lime on the 
internal working procedures of the parliament). The significant implication is the 
parliaments have no capacity (political) and courage to exercise their constitutional 
power.  
The findings implied that the parameters are not acting as principals but as agents 
of the executive branch, while the executive branch and its authorities are working as 
principals in the studied scope. The study brought a sensitive issue, which is believed to 
be untouchable by most of the participants. I firmly believe that this is the primary 
success of the study, which I trust is a significant contribution triggering a revision of the 
current practice.  
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol Form and Questionnaire   
Project:  Political Control and Accountability in the Ethiopian Rulemaking  
Academic Institutions: Walden University  
Sponsoring: Organization: INSA 
Date:  To be decided  
Time:  To be decided 
Duration:  About 45 minutes     
Location:  To be decided  
Interviewer:  Esayas Araya 
Interviewee: Honorable Member of Parliament / Appointed official  
Bridging 
Before I start interviewing, I want to thank and appreciate your participation in the study. 
The purpose of the meeting is to conduct an interview session to address your experiences 
on the issue of political control of administrative agencies to exercise power to make rules 
and oversight the application of the power in rulemaking  As a legislator / or government 
official.  The interview is expected to last about 1 hour. Before we begin,  
1.  Please note that this interview is to be audio recorded for use as data for coding and 
analysis, 
2.   The treatment of your answers and your identity confidential 
3.  The study will not report on individual participation, and you may withdraw at any time.   
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Thus, the purpose of this study will be eliciting the possibility of non-compliance in the 
application of delegated legislative power and preventive mechanisms in the Ethiopian 
context.  
Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaire 
              Section B: Introductory Questions 
1. I understand your role in parliament is Or As a government official:___________  
What are the additional roles you have been playing in the parliament, roles such standing 
committee chair or any ad hoc committee, or in the executive offices? 
Section B:  About the Importance of Delegating Legislative Power   
2. What is your conception of the importance of authorization of executive organs to make 
rules? 
3. Would you explain why the delegation of power could be useful regarding good 
governance, efficiency, and effectiveness in the public service delivery?    
4. What do you think should the extent of delegating legislative power to be?   
Section C:  Doctrine of legislative Delegation of Legislative Oversight 
5. What do legislative control mechanism you think is recommendable? Alternatively, already 
in place?   
6. How autonomous should you think the public bodies be in the exercise of their delegated 
power?    
7. How do you think political control could be necessary for the exercise of delegated power?    
Section D:  Political Control and registration of vital events and national identity card 
proclamation number, 760/ 2012(Particular Chapter three of the legislation) 
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8. Tell me about any debate and justification about chapter three of the legislation  in your 
memory 
9. Please explain the purpose of delegating to the non-exiting organ as mentioned in article 
69(2) as an appropriate federal organ? Moreover, why was not mandatory for the cabinet 
to establish the appropriate organ?   
10. Though, the legislation said, the national program will be operational within two years, 
(until 2014) where it is now?  
11. How do you explain the delegation doctrine and legislative oversight mechanism in lights 
of the operationalization of the identity card policy and its status?    
12. Tell me about any ongoing activity or plan for the national identity card program?       
Section E: Exit 
 Would you like to add anything else? I will be happily ready to listen.  
Closure 
o Thank you, again for your participation. 
o I want to reassure- you that I will keep the confidentiality of the data and your identity. 
o I would like you to have an opportunity to review the interview after I transcribe it. May I 
have your email for that purpose only?   
 Declined_____________ 
 Email _____________ 
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Appendix C: Examples of Delegation Clauses   
No.  
Proclamation 
No.  
 Purpose of the 
legislation 
Delegation clause    Condition/ 
restriction     
  
 1 
804/2013 
National 
Intelligence and 
Security Service 
Reestablishment 
Proclamation 
 
 
  To protect 
and safeguard 
the national 
security of the 
country   
1. ―The Council of Ministers may 
Issue regulations necessary for the 
implementation of this 
Proclamation. 
2.  ―The Service may issue directives 
necessary for the implementation 
of this Proclamation and 
regulations issued pursuant to sub-
article (1) of this Article.‖ 
 No 
condition 
 2 Proclamation 
No.760/2012 
Registration of 
Vital Events and 
National Identity 
Card 
Proclamation. 
  1.Introduce 
uniform  
national 
identity card  
2. Introduces 
vital events 
registration 
  
1. ―The Council of Ministers may 
issue regulation necessary for the 
implementation of this 
Proclamation‘.  
2. ―The appropriate federal organ 
may issue directives necessary for 
 
No 
condition 
or 
restriction 
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the implementation of this 
Proclamation and regulation 
issued in accordance with sub-
article (1) of this Article.‖ 
3 
 
 
Proclamation 
No. 943/2016 
Federal Attorney 
General 
Establishment 
Proclamation 
  
  Establishment 1. ―The Council of Ministers may 
issue regulations necessary to 
enforce this Proclamation.‖  
2. The Federal Attorney General 
may issue directives necessary 
for the enforcement of this 
Proclamation and regulations 
issued pursuant to sub-article (1) 
of this Proclamation.‖ 
    No  
condition 
or 
restriction 
4 Proclamation 
NO.1048/2017 
Railway 
Transport 
Administration 
Proclamation 
 The Council of Ministers shall issue 
Regulations necessary for the 
implementation of this Proclamation: 
2/ The Ministry shall issue directives 
for the implementation of this 
Proclamation and regulations issued 
pursuant to sub-article (1) of this 
Article. 
No 
condition 
or 
restriction 
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Appendix D: Samples of Unimplemented Delegation (Taken From a Study by Attorney 
General) 
No.   Issue number 
and  year of 
publication 
   Delegated authority  
     
Type of law to be enacted Status of the 
regulation or 
directive  
Accoun
tability 
reporte
d 
 
1. 
 Labor 377/ 2003   
1. The council of ministers 
2.  The minister of Labor 
and social affairs   
1. Council regulations (at 
least one regulation 
2. Ministry directive 
(directives on 5 or 5 issues  
1. No regulation 
(15 years_ 
2.  Not all 
directives 
 No   
2 proclamation 
number, 760/ 
2012 
  
1. Council of ministers  
2. Appropriate organ (to be 
established 
  
1. Regulation 
2. Directives  
 None No  
3.   
 
  Proclamation 
number 
841/2015 
 
    
1. Council of ministers  
2.  ministry of water, electric 
city, and irrigation 
1. Regulation 
2. directives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Neither of them No 
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 Proclamation no. 
804/2013 a 
proclamation to 
reestablish the 
national 
intelligence and 
security service 
 1. Regulation 
2. Directive  
 
1. No regulation 
2.  Not sure 
 No, 
     
   
      
4 Foreign Service 
Proclamation, 
No. 790/2013. 
1. Council of ministers  
2. ministry of foreign affairs  
 
1. regulation 
2. directives ( about five) 
No directives 
No regulation 
no 
